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What does Ramon Llull mean when he says «[el resclús] se maravellá com 
podia esser que Déus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per 
son poble la natura divina», (Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles, Ch. 105, «De la oració»)?
Què vol dir Ramon Llull quan escriu «[el resclús] se maravellá com podia esser 
que Deus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per son poble la 
natura divina», (Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles, Ch. 105, «De la oració»)?
Abstract: The proto-novel Fèlix, o Llibre de meravelles contains many unsettling «meravelles» or «wonders». One such 
consists in an observation made by a «recluse» —rather than by a professional theologian— concerning the prayers 
of Christ and of Mary and the angels, etc., to the effect that their prayers have been unable to call forth any response 
from God. The efficacy of such prayers is thus brought into question, as is the readiness of God’s mercy and grace. By 
contextualising such matters within medieval currents of Neoplatonism, particularly the doctrine of causality, I argue 
that Llull presents a causally conceived theorisation of the hypostatic union. I identify Biblical and medieval precedents 
for and contrasts with Llull’s position on prayer and relate this latter to the sometimes fluid notions of orthodoxy as 
regards Christological matters among medieval writers, pausing to focus in particular on Llull’s use of the soul-body 
analogy for the union of natures in Christ. I examine the apparent contradiction present in Llull’s construal of the 
efficacy of Christ’s prayer—in this context, implicitly conceived as a prayer of petition—and attempt to resolve this 
contradiction in a way which indicates clearly Ramon Llull’s relation to orthodoxy at least during the period 1274-89.
Keywords: Ramon Llull’s Christology; doctrine of causality; hypostatic union; soul-body analogy; Christ’s prayer 
Resum: La proto-novel·la Fèlix, o Llibre de Meravelles, conté moltes inquietants «Meravelles» o «prodigis». Una 
d’aquestes consisteix en una observació feta per un «reclús» —en lloc de per un professional teòleg— relativa a les 
oracions de Crist i de Maria i els àngels, etc., en el sentit que les seues oracions no han estat suficients per provocar 
cap resposta de Déu. L’eficàcia d’aquestes oracions és, així, posada en dubte, ja que és la disposició de la misericòrdia 
i la gràcia de Déu. Per contextualitzar aquests assumptes dins dels corrents medievals de neoplatonisme, en particular 
la doctrina de la causalitat, sostinc que Llull presenta una teorització causalment concebuda de la unió hipostàtica. 
Identifique precedents bíblics i medievals a favor i en contra de la posició de Llull en l’oració, i relacione aquest 
últim amb les nocions de vegades subtils de l’ortodòxia, pel que fa a qüestions cristològiques entre els escriptors 
medievals, centrant-me en particular en l’ús que fa Llull de l’analogia ànima-cos per a la unió de naturaleses en 
Crist. Examine l’aparent contradicció present en conceptualització de Llull de l’eficàcia de l’oració a Crist, en aquest 
context, concebut de manera implícita com una oració de petició i tracte de resoldre aquesta contradicció d’una 
manera que indica clarament la relació de Ramon Llull amb l’ortodòxia, almenys durant el període 1274-1289.
Paraules clau: Cristologia de Ramon Llull; doctrina de la causalitat; unió hipostàtica; analogia cos-ànima; pregària de Crist 
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Introduction1
The first thing we should bear in mind when examining the above question is that the work Fèlix 
o Llibre de meravelles was written during Llull’s first stay in Paris between the years 1287-9. During 
this period Llull is thought to have familiarised himself  with the corpus dionysiacum, a body of  texts 
strongly influenced by the writings of  Proclus and in particular the latter’s Elementatio theologica, a 
Neoplatonic work concerning causality, among other things, and structured along Euclidean lines 
(Ruiz Simon 2005: 167-96, esp. 178-82; Dondaine 1953: 122-28). Although the scholastics were 
unaware that the writings of  the Pseudo-Dionysius postdated those of  Proclus, and attributed 
to the former almost apostolic authority, they did become aware, through the advertisements of  
St Thomas Aquinas, that the Liber de causis, a work formerly thought to have been part of  the 
Aristotelian corpus, had as its primary source Proclus’ Elementatio theologica. This fact was revealed 
to Aquinas by William of  Moerbeke’s recent translation for him of  the latter from the Greek, 
completed in 1268, although it was probably also apparent to William himself. 
The Liber de causis, on the other hand, had been widely circulated since the start of  the thirteenth 
century in Europe under two titles, the Liber Aristotelis de expositione bonitatis purae and the Liber de 
causis, having been translated after 1167 from an Arabic exemplar in Toledo by Gerard of  Cremona 
(† 1187) (Anon. 1984: 4; Aquinas 1996: ix-xi; Proclus 2004 [2nd ed. 1963]: xxx). Aquinas, in turn, 
composed a commentary on this text, entitled Super Librum de causis expositio, probably written 
between 1269 and 1273, which represents part of  as well as comments upon the Christian and 
Arabic mediation of  Neoplatonism to the medieval Latin West. (The commentary on the same 
work produced earlier by his teacher Albert the Great, on the other hand, under the title of  Liber de 
causis et processu universitatis still considered the Liber to be part of  the Aristotelian corpus.) Aquinas’ 
Commentary also clearly marks the endpoint of  a transmission from Greek via Arabic into Latin, 
though also possibly at least one of  the starting points for further speculation on causality. His text 
also pointed towards the existence of  strong similarities between the thought of  Proclus and that 
1 In both Llull 1985 and Llull 1989 (the former in English, the latter in Catalan), Bonner has provided a footnote with 
helpful references to the Lullian literature on prayer, (Llull 1985: 1040, n. 233 and Llull 1989: 338, n. 249). I plan to 
examine and write upon this literature at a later date. The current article therefore needs to be supplemented by much 
fuller reference thereto. English-speaking readers should note that the verb exoir is the Old Catalan for exaudir (Lat. 
exaudire) and consists of  two combined meanings: to heed and to respond to or grant the wishes of.
I should like to thank Anna Fernàndez Clot for providing bibliographical information relating to Lullian texts as well as 
details of  structure and content relating to the Medicina de pecat, of  which she is preparing a critical edition and study for 
her Doctorate. I should also like to thank a number of  individuals for reading earlier drafts of  this article and for their 
helpful and sometimes challenging comments thereon. First, Anthony Bonner for his general insights and his acute 
advice on writing style (all remaining deficiencies in this respect are mine alone); second, Lola Badia for her ongoing 
support of  my Llull studies; third, Albert Soler, for bringing the subject of  this article to my attention; fourth, Josep 
Enric Rubio Albarracín for his comments thereon and his inclusion of  this article in the present collection; and last 
but by no means least, Josep Maria Ruiz Simon, whose observations have considerably altered the way I now view the 
questions treated in this article. Finally, I should like to thank the Director of  Scripta for agreeing to include this article 
in its present form. This article is the result of  independent research and has been self-funded.
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of  the Pseudo-Dionysius, and clearly reveals that he made careful comparisions between the texts 
of  the Liber de causis, the Elementatio theologica and Pseudo-Dionysian works (Ruiz Simon 2005: 185; 
Aquinas 1996: xx-xxi).
It is highly probable that Ramon Llull familiarised himself  with most if  not all of  the works named 
above while he was at Paris. It is even possible that he read Aquinas’s Commentary as well. The 
works of  the Pseudo-Dionysius and of  the author of  the Liber de causis, having as they do Proclus’ 
Elementatio theologica as their base or remote cause, are nevertheless unlike the latter insofar as they 
are monotheistic—and creationist—remodellings thereof  and thus, in the eyes of  Aquinas, at least, 
consonant with the Christian faith. What they all have in common, however, is their focus on the 
concept of  causality, the Procline First Cause being equated in the aforementioned monotheistic 
texts with God. What these latter—i.e. Christian—texts have in common is that they collapse the 
self-subsistent Forms of  Platonic origin, which in Procline Neoplatonism become a profusion 
of  intermediary hypostases, into the attributes or Names of  God.2 We should note, however, 
as Brand does in the endnotes to his translation of  the Book of  Causes, the differences between 
Neoplatonic and Aristotelian conceptions of  causality. Brand states: «Causality in Neo-Platonism 
is not, as it is in Aristotelianism, to educe act from potency; rather, it is to imprint, impress, or give 
act to another» (Anon. 1984: 46, n. 7). As defined by the International Theological Commission 
(1981: II. B. 3.) the divine essence, at the very least, here in relation to theopaschite controversies, 
is immutable and impassible and therefore does not possess the «passivity that would permit a 
movement from potency to act», thus excluding explanations in keeping with Aristelian causality. 
Neoplatonic causality, as defined above, however, would seem to encounter no impediments to 
being applied to that essence.
This distinction may have some bearing on the question of  whether Llull ever made the further 
distinction between the analogy of  the mirror and that of  the imprint or seal, a question raised 
by Mary Franklin Brown (Brown 2012: 368, n. 111). It should be mentioned in passing that in 
Chapter II, 5, of  his De divinis nominibus (hereafter DDN), the Pseudo-Dionysius uses the example 
of  the seal to illustrate how the entire wholeness of  a thing participated is participated: ‘There are 
numerous impressions of  the seal and these all have a share in the original prototype; it is the same 
whole seal in each of  the impressions and none participates in only a part’ (Pseudo-Dionysius 
1987: 62), and that the non-participation of  the Godhead exceeds this example by far (ibid.: 63). 
The Latin version of  the texts reads: «et sicut multae figurae sigilli expressae archetypum sigillum 
participant, et in unaquaque figura sigilli expressa totum et idem sigillum est, et in nulla figura 
2 According to Guagliardo, it is Aquinas interpretation of  the first proposition of  the Liber de causis—relating as it does 
to the fundamental theorem of  causality—in terms of  the Aristotelian four causes and, more specifically, in terms of  
efficient causes that are universal and per se that obviates the need for separated (i.e. Platonic) forms as causes (Aquinas 
1996: xx). It is only after he has dispensed with its separatist nature that Aquinas embraces the Platonic principle of  
causality and participation (Aquinas 1996: xx, n. 32). For the Pseudo-Dionysian «correction» of  Proclus regarding 
separatism, see Ruiz Simon (2005: 188, n. 32).
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secundum ullam partem. Vincit autem haec exempla divinitatis, quae omnium causa est» (Pseudo-
Dionysius 1857: 644A-B).
  In the present article all references to «first cause» are to be taken in the Neoplatonic 
rather than Aristotelian sense. These two differing conceptions of  causality are noted by Ruiz 
Simon (2005: 189, n. 34) and their co-presence can be observed at the very least in Chapter IV, 10, 
of  DDN by the Pseudo-Dionysius (1987: 79; 1857: 705D). We also find both at work in the texts 
of  Ramon Llull. Of  special interest as regards the present article is that in his DDN, the Pseudo-
Dionysius, when dispensing with the self-subsistent Forms, seems to make specific reference to the 
Names of  God qua names as representing forms of  praise, that is to say, worship. Colm Luibheid’s 
translation of  Chapter V, 2, has a different text from the one by John Scotus Eriugena in his Versio 
operum sancti Dionysii Areopagitae as given by Migne in PL 122, which latter states: 
Non aliud autem esse optimum dicit, et aliud ὄν, et aliud vitam, aut sapientiam, neque multa 
causalia, et aliorum alias creatrices deitates supereminentes et subditas: sed unius Dei totas 
optimas processiones, et a nobis laudatas divinas nominationes (Eriugena 1841-64: 1147 C; 
emphasis added). 
The English translation simply reads: «But I hold that there is one God for all these good processions 
and that he is the possessor of  the divine names» (Pseudo-Dionysius 1987: 97; emphasis added). The 
Latin version in PG, however, reads: «Non dicit (haec nostra tractatio) aliud esse bonum, et aliud 
ens, aliudque vitam, vel sapientiam, neque multas causas, et alias aliorum effectrices divinitates, 
superiores et inferiores, sed unius Dei universas bonas emanationes, et nominationes Dei a nobis 
laudatas» (Pseudo-Dionysius 1857: 816D-817A; emphasis added), which can be seen to correspond 
in its major lines with Eriugena’s version
All this is of  relevance to Llull’s doctrine of  God as primary cause, to his recasting of  the Principles 
of  his Art in the transition from the Quaternary to the Ternary Phase, and to his understanding 
of  Christ in the hypostatic union as the conjunction of  the uncreated with the created, the infinite 
with the finite—and, following Augustinian indications, the image with the exemplar and signum 
with res—as well as, of  particular interest here, of  the primary cause with the superlative effect (i.e. 
causa with causatum). Ramon Llull emphasises this point not least in the Compendium seu commentum 
artis demonstrativae (1289), Dist. 1, «De quarta parte figurae. Per secundum modum multiplicationis», 
§ 2, where he refers to the «major differentia, quam B (God) posit dare ipsi C (creature), est, quod 
intelligat magnam E, videlicet magnam distinctionem in divinis, et per consequens inter causam 
quae est ipsum B, et effectum, qui est ipsum C» (Llull 1722: 70 (363)). Should it surprise us that 
Llull is pointing to a great difference (E) between cause and caused in the Incarnation, we can be 
reassured that, had he in this particular instance articulated all the meanings of  all the relevant 
letters of  his Alphabet in this section of  the work, he would surely have gone straight on to say 
that there was likewise a great concordance (F, the next letter) between cause and caused. Antoni 
Bordoy has described the latter conjunction in the following terms:
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Malgrat que sembli una idea compatible amb el dogma cristià, la plasmació del Verbum en la 
creació no és quelcom freqüent en tant que implica un cert contacte entre la Causa prima et 
suum effectum, principi que trenca amb la transcendentalitat causal de Procle que adopten amb 
relativa facilitat els autors del segle XIII, entre els quals Tomàs d’Aquino no n’és una excepció 
(Bordoy 2006: 616).
We should also recall in this context the emphasis Ruiz Simon has placed on the importance 
of  Ramon Llull’s understanding of  causality to his reformulation of  his Art as an overall 
«epistemological project» (Ruiz Simon 2005: 187). For our purposes, however, it is not necessary 
to be able to prove a direct influence upon Llull of  St Thomas’s Commentary, nor even of  the 
Liber de causis itself. It is sufficient merely to indicate that in the thirteenth century there existed 
what Vincent A. Guagliardo has called «a “communally” worked out and so continually developing 
philosophical heritage» surrounding the Liber de causis and its Procline predecessor (Aquinas 1996, 
xxxi).
Having said that, there are certain propositions in the Liber de causis which derive from corresponding 
ones in the Elementatio theologica and which might have proved very suggestive to Llull. The first 
of  these is Proposition 1 from the Liber, one which has its roots in Propositions 56 and 70 of  
the latter work. Proposition 1.1 states, in fact, that «omnis causa primaria plus est influens super 
suum causatum quam causa secunda universalis». In other words, following Proclus, the effects of  
secondary causes are caused in virtue of  the primary cause. Other propositions include numbers 
9 [10], 18 [19] and 19 [20], as well as, less directly, 11 [12], 21 [22] and 23 [24], all of  which 
are based on Proclus’ Proposition 173, from which the jointly ontological and epistemological 
principle «Quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur» (i.e. that of  the limited receptivity of  
the created world)—a principle to which, as we shall see, Llull has constant recourse—ultimately 
derives.3 This principle was a scholastic adage which had its immediate roots in Thomas Aquinas’s 
Summa theologiae, Ia, q. 75, a. 5 co.: «omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum 
recipientis»; IIIa, q. 11, a. 5 co., referring to Christ’s knowledge: «nam receptum est in recipiente per 
modum recipientis»; and Summa contra gentiles, I, Ch. 43: «Omnis actus alteri inhaerens terminationem 
recipit ex eo in quo est: quia quod est in altero, est in eo per modum recipientis»; as well as his 
Super Librum de causis expositio, Commentary on Proposition 4: «quia quod participatur non recipitur 
in participante secundum totam suam infinitatem sed particulariter» (Aquinas 1954: 30); which 
latter Guagliardo translates as: «because what is participated is not received in the one participating 
according to its entire infinity but in the manner of  a particular» (Aquinas 1996: 33). This idea was 
already present, at least noetically, in the Pseudo-Dionysius’ De divinis nominibus, I, 1, which states 
that «the things of  God are revealed to each mind in proportion to its capacities and the divine 
goodness is such that, out of  concern for our salvation, it deals out the immeasurable and infinite 
in limited measures» (Pseudo-Dionysius 1987: 49) or, as the Latin text states: «pro singularum 
captu mentium divina revelantur, spectanturque, dum summa Dei bonitas, justitia salutari, rebus 
3 I follow the numeration of  the propositions given in Brand’s edition of  the Liber de causis. For Proclus’ Prop. 173, see 
Proclus (2004 [2nd ed. 1963]: 150-53).
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mensuratis immensitatem suam divino quadam decore, quod comprehendi nequeat, commensurat» 
(Pseudo-Dionysius 1857: 588A-588B).
Aphorisms 98-99 of  the Liber de causis, Proposition 9 [10], state the doctrine of  «reception according 
to the capacity of  the receiver», as this principle is sometimes called (Aquinas 1996: 75). The 
principle itself  is thought to derive from Plotinus’ Enneads, VI, 4-5 (Anon. 1984: 48, n. 31 and 47, 
n. 26.). This notion is not present in Proclus’ Proposition 177, although it is present in Proposition 
173: «For each principle participates its superiors in the measure of  its natural capacity, and not in 
the measure of  their being» and «participation varies with the distinctive character and capacity of  
the participants», as Proclus states (2004 [2nd ed.]: 151).  At this point, I should just like to speculate 
that a remote source of  Llull’s dynamic understanding of  the hypostatic union in Christ might be 
found in Proclus’ Proposition 103 as specifically articulated in aphorism 106 of  the Liber de causis, 
11 [12], which latter asserts in a way the former does not that «every one of  the First Things [i.e. 
Being, Life, Intelligence] is either a cause or an effect», or, as Brand glosses it, «is [simultaneously] 
both cause and effect». The Liber continues by stating that «[t]herefore, the effect is in the cause 
after the mode of  the cause, and the cause is in the effect after the mode of  the effect» (Anon. 
1984: 30 and n. 35; cf. Aquinas 1996: 90). This last point is only a suggestion and requires further 
investigation, given that although Proclus and the Liber de causis deal with this question specifically 
in relation to the hierarchy of  sense, Soul and Intelligence, it is Aquinas alone who fully draws out 
the more general implications for prior and posterior things, i.e. causes and things caused (Aquinas 
1996: 90).
 
Table 1: Propositions from the Liber de causis which derive from either the Elementatio theologica or some other 
source: 4
Liber de causis Elementatio theologica Other source
Prop. 1 Props. 56, 70 ------
Prop. 9 [10] Prop. 177, which depends
on Prop. 173
Possible source for part of  
Prop. 173 in Plotinus’ 
Enneads, VI, 4-5.
Prop. 11 [12] Prop. 103 ------
Prop. 18 [19] Prop. 111 ------
Prop. 19 [20] Prop. 122 ------
Prop. 21 [22] No source in Proclus Possible source in Plotinus’
Enneads, V, 2.1.
Prop. 23 [24] Prop. 142 ------
4 The combined information in this table is taken largely from the notes of  Guagliardo in Aquinas (1996).
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The context for the above table resides in the role the Liber de causis played in bringing about a 
symbiotic relationship between the works of  Proclus and those of  the Pseudo-Dionysius in the 
second half  of  the thirteenth century, the Liber also being used by medieval writers to interpret 
the latter’s texts as well as Christian theology in the light of  what was presumed to be a work of  
Aristotelian philosophical theology (Ruiz Simon 2005: 184). The table itself  can be summarised 
very briefly in terms of  its conceptual content, at least as far as the Liber is concerned. First, 
Proposition 1 expresses the fundamental theorem of  causality, from which we can glean the relative 
strengths of  first and second causes. Second, Propositions 9 [10], 11 [12], 18 [19], 19 [20], 21 
[22] and 23 [24] all express either ontologically or epistemologically the limited receptivity of  the 
created realm vis-à-vis the infused powers or influentia transmitted by the uncreated deity. The fact 
that Proposition 1 occupies such a prominent place is not surprising, given that the text in question 
is a treatise on causality. But the fact that in a short and dense text six further propositions state the 
other principle, and that the treatise is also monotheistic and creationist suggest that it may have 
shaped Llull’s thought in excess of  any influence he may have received from the Elementatio theologica 
and the corpus dionysiacum.  
Bordoy seems to agree that the fundamental theorem—or first law—of  causality as expressed in 
the Liber de causis, at least, deriving as it does from Proclus’s Propositions 56 and 57, had a profound 
influence on Llull’s thinking, though concludes that 
la metafísica de Llull sembla recollir el rerefons de l’estructura del teorema 57 de Procle, en 
el sentit que és la potència de la causa més comprehensiva el que permet entendre-la com a 
superior per necessitat al seu efecte. No obstant, resulta difícil establir si l’origen d’aquest 
postulat lul·lià es troba en el Liber de Causis o procedeix d’una interpretació dels Elements de 
teologia de Procle, tot i que les semblances de contingut semblen indicar com a més probable la 
segona de les dues opcions (Bordoy 2006: 426-27).
Bordoy also points to the influence of  the Pseudo-Dionysius on Llull over and above that of  the 
Liber de causis, namely, with respect to the idea of  the transcendentality of  the first cause (ibid.: 
428). It should be noted, however, that Bordoy rejects a more wholesale influence of  Proclus upon 
Ramon Llull, finding evidence instead that Llull’s thought developed along Porphyrian-Calcidian-
Pseudo-Dionysian lines (ibid.: 416-463, 484-503, 602-11).
My claim, however, rests on the following grounds: The inherent inequality between the two 
orders—uncreated and created—as expressed by the Liber de causis in particular means that the 
cyclical Christian-Neoplatonic return is never absolutely assured, even if  supplemented by the 
causally conceived and, in terms of  created being, most perfect figure of  Jesus Christ. I believe 
it is this uncertainty that Llull is expressing in the passage from Fèlix quoted in the title. This 
is because the asymmetry between—or unequal efficacy of—first and second causes seems to 
find its corollary in the similar asymmetry between the two natures conjoined in the hypostatic 
union in Christ. I make this claim despite what Richard Cross says about the rejection of  causally 
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conceived theorisations of  the hypostatic union by Duns Scotus at the very least (Cross 2002: 136, 
166, regarding the unrelatedness of  the Word’s special indwelling in the assumed human nature 
to any sort of  efficient causality; and 168, regarding Scotus’ belief  that hypostatically sustaining 
a created nature is in no way a causal kind of  state). What medieval theologians in general reject, 
according to Cross, is that the state of  being incarnate places «an incarnate being in any sort of  
causal relationship with anything external to that being» (Cross 2002: 152-55; here, 152-53; emphasis 
added). It should also be mentioned in passing that, in terms of  Roman Catholic orthodoxy, I 
believe, any asymmetry between Christ’s divine and human nature’s is only apparent, given that his 
human nature is that of  the Person of  the Son of  God and any such asymmetry therein is cancelled 
out—«theandrically», so to speak. The reader should consult David B. Burrell on the theandric 
nature of  Christ’s mediation (Burrell 2011: 174).
Although the literature on causality deriving from Procline and Pseudo-Dionysian roots evidently 
does not specify a conjunction without confusion, alteration, division or  natures if  we accept 
the Chalcedonian formula, according to Ruiz Simon it does allow—as the Aristotelian doctrine 
of  causality does not—for the conjoined action between a hypothetical first cause and a second 
(or immediate) cause, this collaboration between first and second causes deriving via the Liber de 
causis from Proclus’ Elementatio theologica (Ruiz Simon 2005: 187-88 and n. 32; and esp. 191). It is 
eminently possible, therefore, that Llull might have seen this literature as a filter through which to 
view two degrees of  causality in Christ as being associated with his two natures and vice versa (Ruiz 
Simon 2005:183-93, re. the Dionysian-Procline filter operative in Llull’s writings). 
Evidence for the fact that divine actions may be attributed to the divine nature (rather than person) 
can be found in both Aquinas and Henry of  Ghent (Cross 2002: 155). Cross also gives detailed 
discussion concerning the complexities of  attributing Christ’s human actions to the causal origin of  
His human nature, conceived as an individual substance-like thing (Cross 2002: 218-29). Ramon 
Llull, on the other hand, effectively attributes causality, acting in both directions, to the divine and 
the human components of  the hypostatic union in the context of  a discussion of  the Trinity as 
God’s supreme internal and the Incarnation as God’s supreme external operation. He does so by 
referring to the Dignities or divine attributes as the divine component and the term creatura to 
indicate the human component, in his Liber principiorum theologiae (hereafter LPT), 4.1.2 [Secunda pars 
De humanitate Christi]: «quod maius D (Operation) bonitatis et perfectionis ipsius C (Dignities) 
in creatura, et creaturae in ipso C, sit incarnatio», (Llull 2007: 49). What we are looking at here, in 
Llull’s case, is a version of  the doctrine of  dyotheletism, namely, the Christological view as declared 
by the Third Council of  Constantinople (681) that Christ has two wills or «modes of  operation» 
which correspond to his two natures, the version in this case involving two wills conceived as two 
forms of  causality. What we should consider, however, is whether—if  my hypothesis is correct—
Llull might be responsible for a form of  what Richard Cross calls «causal overdetermination».
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Cross states that, if  we assume that the causal origin of  the Son of  God’s actions is the Son of  God 
or Word Himself, then 
the causal origin of  the human actions cannot be the assumed nature (or its causal powers), 
otherwise we would have two causal origins for one and the same action—and, furthermore, 
for the sort of  action that appears to be sufficiently causally explained by the presence of  
merely one causal origin (Cross 2002: 218).
A way of  avoiding such overdetermination, though not without its own theologically undesirable 
consequences, he suggests, is to conclude that the human nature and its activities are merely 
instrumental with respect to the Second Person of  the Trinity, the «human nature’s causal powers 
[being] merely moved by the Word» (idem). A further distinction is made by Cross between causal 
and predicative aspects of  agency (Cross 2002: 219). One such undesirable consequence is that, if  
the human nature is conceived as a «total instrument», it cannot possess a will; but since orthodoxy 
stresses two wills in Christ, Christ’s human nature cannot be «a total instrument of  the Word» 
(Cross 2011: 197-98). What we should perhaps note in this regard, however, is John of  Damascus’s 
comments in De fide orthodoxa, III, 14, first, to the effect that Christ’s wills and operations are 
«natural» rather than «personal» (John of  Damascus 1864: 1035A); second, to the effect that, as 
a result of  the unicity of  Christ’s Personhood, «unus etiam proinde est volens, tam divina quam 
humana ratione» (ibid.: 1035C); and, further, in III, 15, that «tametsi in Theandrica, seu in Dei simul 
et hominis actione nequeant disjungi» (ibid.: 1055A). For a brief  discussion of  «theandric» energy 
in Christ, a concept forged by the pseudo-Dionysius in his Letter 4, ‘To the same monk Gaius’, the 
reader should consult Louth (2002 [2004]: 153-54).
Nevertheless, given that in Proclus’ text and the Liber de causis, the human intellective soul fulfils 
the role of  second cause and that Christ’s human spiritual soul is what connects his corporeal 
human nature to his Divinity (Hughes 2005-06: 13-14 and n. 29; 33), the humanity of  Christ, as 
repository of  his soul—that is to say, the man God—could come to represent for Llull the locus 
of  a maximal downward influentia or Neoplatonic procession and, correspondingly, in conjunction 
with his divinity, of  a maximal upward refluentia or return (Ruiz Simon 2005: 189). What this means 
is that, for Llull, Christ could be seen as the second cause and that, as second cause, he is in his 
humanity eminently so. By the same token, of  course, man would also be considered a second 
cause, though to a lesser degree, given that his virtut or potency is not so great. What’s more, 
however, the theory of  causality expressed by Proclus and synoptically by the Liber de causis quite 
possibly led Llull to reconceive his understanding of  the hypostatic union and the communicatio 
idiomatum (or «communication of  properties») in Christ, thus enabling him to reconfigure in a 
more philosophically amenable or satisfactory way the «conjoined action» and «collaboration» of  
the divine person in Christ with His human nature, the agency and efficacy of  His human will (as 
part of  his soul) now being able to be more systematically calibrated against that of  His divine 
will. Here we should attend to Cross’s assertion that «[t]he schoolmen universally understand the 
communication of  properties to be the ascription of  divine and human properties to the (divine) 
person» (Cross 2002: 183; emphasis in original). What such a readjustment may have also enabled 
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Llull to do was to superimpose a Neoplatonic account of  causality, and of  Christ’s dual agency 
in particular, onto a traditional—and for Llull, continuing—account thereof  according to the 
Aristotelian four causes. In so doing and given such Neoplatonising focus, Llull might have been 
able to arrive at the view, also attributed by Richard Cross—although for different reasons—to 
John Duns Scotus, namely, that «the relation between human and divine wills [in Christ] is just a 
standard case of  secondary causality» (Cross 2011: 198).
Christ is certainly seen by Llull, in his mature writings at least, to be the secondary efficient, exemplary 
and final cause of  creation: efficient cause with regard to creation and recreation (the latter, loosely 
speaking, indicating redemption, though conceived in fuller «recreative» Bonaventurian terms);5 
exemplary cause insofar as Christ is both superlative image and exemplar; and final cause insofar 
as he is the source of  God’s hominification and man’s deification.6 It is worth just mentioning 
in passing that a good part of  the evolution in Llull’s Christology between 1273 and 1315 may 
be attributable to his general shift in emphasis away from elemental theories and, therefore, the 
«material cause» of  creation, and towards its «final cause», viz. deification and hominification. 
Given the orthodoxy of  the dyothelite position, the asymmetrical nature of  causality, and the 
asymmetrical nature of  the hypostatic union, however, it seems perfectly feasible that Llull would 
have felt entitled to map the doctrine of  causality found in Proclus and beyond onto the hypostatic 
union and to reinterpret the former in the light of  the latter should the opportunity arise. At 
the very least, they might have been seen to be mutually reinforcing doctrines and reciprocal 
instantiations of  each other. Although Llull’s work Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles is far from being an 
attempt to axiomatise the medieval science of  theology, it is quite possible that what Ruiz Simon 
has called a «solid doctrinal block» embodying the works of  Proclus and the Pseudo-Dionysius, not 
to mention the Liber de causis, has a diffuse if  not entirely systematic role to play in the formulation 
and expression of  theological content within Fèlix (Ruiz Simon 2005: 185).
Given that Duns Scotus, along with other medieval theologians, upheld the Augustinian-derived 
maxim according to which, «indivisa sunt opera Trinitatis ad extra»—although Augustine’s actual 
words in his Enchiridion ad Laurentiam, 12. 38 are «neque enim separabilia sunt opera Trinitatis» 
(Augustine 1841-64a: 252)—, and whereby, as Augustine reiterates in his De Trinitate, 1. 4. 7., «pater 
et filius et spiritus sanctus sicut inseparabiles sunt, ita inseparabiliter operentur» (Augustine 1841-
64b: 824), it is not surprising that the former, at least, should conclude that the relation between 
the human nature and the Word of  God is not one of  caused to cause, since that [i.e. causality] 
is common to the whole Trinity.7 I would conjecture, however, that Llull might be rejecting this 
5 For a consideration of  Llull’s views on recreation, see Reboiras (2011: 604-615).
6 Llull treats the four Aristotelian causes in their relation to the Incarnation in Llibre de demostracions (Llull 1930: 500-
513); for the Latin text, see Liber mirandarum demonstrationum (Llull 1722a (1965): 203-208 (380-88)).
7 Here I base myself  on the translation of  Scotus’s Ordinatio, 3.1.1.1, n. 14 given in Cross 2011: 202.
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doctrine avant la lettre and attempting progressively, through his development of  the doctrine 
of  the correlatives and its relation to Deitas and humanitas in the correlatives of  deification and 
hominification, along with a Neoplatonising understanding of  primary and secondary causality, 
to address the question of  whether the individual persons of  the Trinity might possess distinct 
causal powers—active, passive and conjunctive—and whether, consequently, it might be possible 
for Christ’s human nature to be viewed as being genuinely an instrument of  the second person 
of  the Trinity alone (Cross 2011: 203). That Ramon Llull attributes difference (as well as equality 
and concordance), that is to say, three of  his relational principles, to the supposits (or Persons) of  
the Divinity in terms of  their power and operation can be seen at the very least in LPT, III, «De 
uiginti quaestionibus […]», q. 1, «Quaestio: Si in B ita se habet ipsum D ad essendum (hoc est, ad 
operandum essentiam) sicut se habet in C D ad bonificandum, magnificandum, possificandum, 
cognoscendum, amandum, perficiendum?»: «idcirco oportet, quamlibet personam fore B (Divine 
essence) sine distinctione ipsius B in C (Dignities), et quod D (operation) ipsius B sit in qualibet Persona 
in C, et etiam, quod D cuiuslibet personae sit in BC» (Llull 2007: 135; emphasis added; cf. also q. 10, in 
ibid.: 140).
2. The apparent contradiction at the heart of  the quotation in question:
On first analysis, the statement from Chapter 105 of  Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles (Paris, 1287-9) to the 
effect that 
[c]om en açó hac considerat longament, [el resclús] se maravellá com podia esser que Deus no 
exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per son poble la natura divina, ni per que no exoya 
santa Maria et tant angel, archangel, martir et confessor qui ha en parays, qui tots preguen 
que lo mon fos bo et en bon estament (Llull 1985 [English] / 1989 [Catalan]: 1043-44 / 341; 
emphasis added)8
would seem openly to contradict the statement Llull makes in the Llibre de contemplació en Déu (1273-
4?) that the reciprocal love between Christ’s humanity and divinity is the greatest possible—«car la 
vostra natura divina ama més la humanitat ab que es unida que totes les altres creatures, e la vostra 
humana natura ama més la vostra deitat que no fan totes les altres creatures» (Llull 1906-14 / ORL 
V: 137). In fact, this earlier statement would very much seem to render implausible the position set 
out in Fèlix. The sentiment expressed in LC is echoed, furthermore, and here specifically related 
to Christ’s great capacity for prayer, in Book IV, Ch. 2, § 4, of  the Llibre de demostracions (1274-6), 
where Llull states that if  the Son of  God is incarnated, He has greater capacity to know and love 
the Supreme (as well as the lowest) Good, than any other existing power; greater capacity to pray, 
8 In my view, the word «tots» in the final clause might plausibly be considered to include Christ as well. We should also 
note Llull’s pessimistic comments which immediately follow this quotation and serve to close the chapter, namely (in 
the Catalan version),  «Estant que lo resclús en esta cogitació estava, e·s meravellava per què Déus tant poc exoïa los 
sants de glòria, ell se adormí e viu en visió com grans són los falliments que los hòmens fan contra Déu, per los quals defalliments tan 
grans no és meravella si Déus leixa los hòmens de aquest món perseverar en lur malícia» (Llull 1989: 341; emphasis added).
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bestow gifts and assist man than any other created power (Llull 1930: 421-22). Llull’s apparent 
position in Fèlix, therefore, brings to mind the view stated in the opening objections to Book III, 
q. 21, a. 4 of  Aquinas’s Summa theologiae on the question of  whether Christ’s prayer was always 
heeded or answered. The four objections all end with the words—or some variation thereupon—
«Ergo videtur quod non omnis eius oratio fuerit exaudita» (Aquinas 1980a: 803), Aquinas, however, 
going on—in his response (ST III, q. 21, a. 4, co.)—to distinguish between an absolute sense 
of  human will as the voluntas rationis and a conditional sense of  will as «velleity» secundum motus 
sensualitatis, vel etiam secundum motum voluntatis simplicis, according to which «Christus nihil aliud voluit 
nisi quod scivit Deum velle. Et ideo omnis absoluta voluntas Christi, etiam humana, fuit impleta, 
quia fuit Deo conformis, et per consequens, omnis eius oratio fuit exaudita» (idem; emphasis added). 
Although encyclopaedic (Brown 2012: 132), Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles, is clearly no formal summa, 
and although religiously minded the «resclús» is no scholastic theologian, which perhaps explains in 
part the absence of  this distinction in Llull’s work and the apparent lack therein of  correspondence 
between human and divine wills in Christ.
Later on in the Llibre de demostracions, in Chapter 43, «De pregar e honrar», however, Llull makes it 
clear that the act of  prayer conveys honour upon not only upon the subject but also the object of  
prayer, in this case God or the Supreme Good who is honoured—«pus diligentment e pus fervent 
e pus sovén dues pregar lo subiran be que t fassa gracia con lo pusques honrar e pregar per ta 
honor e per ton honrament» (Llull 1930: 572 [Catalan]; Llull 1722a  (1965): 233 (410) [Latin]). Here 
also prayer has a degree of  self-reflexivity, insofar as one prays in order to be able to pray (to the 
Supreme Good). What this chapter reveals to us, however, is the exact same metaphysical structure 
of  prayer in Christ as that which is present in the quotation from Fèlix, the difference being that 
here the underlying assumption is that Christ’s prayers will have automatic efficacy whereas in the 
Fèlix quotation the opposite holds true. Llull states in the former instance that «es demostrada 
encarnació e ajustament (i.e. conjunction) de natura divina e humana, per so que la humana pusca 
mills pregar la divina per l umà linyatge» (Llull 1930: 573 [Catalan]; Llull 1722a (1965): 233 (410) 
[Latin]), and, appealing to medieval notions of  social hierarchy, he goes on to outline a very similar 
situation to that of  Fèlix whereby it is the ontological dignity and degree of  honour attributable 
to Christ and, secondly, to the Virgin Mary that lend weight and honour to the prayers they offer 
to the Supreme Good—«per so que la humanitat de Jhesu Crist e Nostra Dona Santa Maria son 
.ij.es creatures mellors e pus honrades que totes les altres, per tal que lo subiran be ne fos pus 
honradament pregat que per totes les altres [the Latin reads here: «honoratius rogaretur ab illis 
quam ab omnibus aliis creaturis»]» (Llull 1930: 574 [Catalan]; Llull 1722a: 233 (410) [Latin])—
even if  in the case of  Fèlix the outcome of  such prayers is not positive. We should note here that 
Christ’s and Mary’s prayers to God are taken in tandem, a fact which supports my reading of  Christ’s 
inclusion among the «tots» in the Fèlix quotation in question (see previous note). I say this despite 
what we read in Bernard (1967: 55-59) to the effect that there is a distinction in kind, based on «une 
communion initiale, celle du Fils avec le Père» (Bernard 1967: 55), between Christ’s prayer and that 
of  any other person. Berrnard, nevertheless, provides an accessible overview of  Christ’s prayers 
and particularly his prayers of  petition (Bernard 1967: 55-77).
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In order to resolve the above apparent contradiction, it is worth considering that the figure of  Christ 
encapsulates two movements—one directed from God towards humanity and the other directed by 
humanity towards God, the first bringing salvation through God’s self-communication, the second 
involving worship through mankind’s grateful response (Dupuis 1994: 125-26). Zachary Hayes in 
fact states, in reiteration of  this point, though here with reference to St Bonaventure’s Commentary 
on the Gospel of  Luke, that Christ «[contains] in Himself  both the descent of  God’s grace-influences 
and the ascent of  the human response» (Hayes 2000 [1st ed. 1981]: 44). For Llull, from 1287-89 
onwards, God’s self-manifestation and love are held to be a superior end of  the Incarnation than 
man’s redemption; they constitute, in fact, the Incarnation’s first intention. Progressively, and as 
at least a loose correlate of  this, God’s hominification takes precedence over man’s deification 
(Hughes 2001: 111-115; Hughes 2005-06: 3-37). In other words, the divine end of  the Incarnation 
is emphasised over its human counterpart. I support this claim by reference to Llull’s Disputació de 
cinc savis (November 1294), where in Part II, Fifth Reason, arguing against the Nestorian, the Latin 
Christian states:
La fi per què és encarnatió és per so que Déus sia home e aquesta és la primera entenció e la 
pus principal per què Déus és encarnat. E la segona entenció és per so que home sia Déu e 
aquesta segona entenció és primera segons comparatió de la redemptió del human gendre, la 
qual redemptió és per la segona entenció (Llull 1986: 75).
Llull goes on to reinforce this point in Part III, Eighth Reason, of  the same work, this time when 
in dispute with the «Jacobite» or Monophysite, again stating that «en la encarnatió és home per 
so que Déus sia home e no és Déus per so que home sia Déus» (Llull 1986: 92), and describing 
the former as the «fi pus noble» (idem). Man’s first intention (to remember, know, love, honour, 
serve and praise God), however, remains constant—and is equally applicable to Christ’s human 
nature—but it is placed lower in the hierarchy than God’s purpose in Creation and Incarnation. 
The divine purpose, in the Ternary Phase and beyond, a phase on the cusp of  which Fèlix stands, 
is seen to bear relation principally to God Himself  rather than to man: that is to say, God creates 
and recreates (via the Incarnation) for Himself  rather than for the benefit of  man. In all this, 
Ramon Llull exhibits both similarities to and differences from what the International Theological 
Commission has characterised as being a tendency of  modern Christology, namely, to conceive 
of  «the purpose of  the redemption (...) more as a hominization than as the deification of  man» 
(International Theological Commission 1981: I. D. 1).
This latter point is made very explicitly in two works written almost contemporaneously to Fèlix, 
namely, the Disputatio fidelis et infidelis (1287-9) (hereafter DFI), where the Catholic in dispute with 
the «Infidel» or non-believer argues that God is the highest Being with all His «Reasons», and that 
He created His effect with respect to Himself  («ad se ipsum»). In other words, uncreated Goodness 
created created (sic) goodness to love that uncreated Goodness etc., (and so on for greatness 
and wisdom). And because Divine Greatness is identical with all the other Divine Reasons, it is 
fitting that the effect is created according to such a disposition that this effect understands greatly, 
loves greatly, magnifies greatly, glorifies greatly etc., God with all His Reasons. Llull concludes his 
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reasoning by asserting that none of  the above can be achieved more excellently than if  Christ’s 
human nature (Christ being most eminent among all created things, i.e. the greatest created effect) 
is united with the Deity (Llull 1729a (1965): 23, 31 (400, 408)). Significantly, however, in this 
passage the foregoing conclusion is based on the following supposition, namely, that God united 
a man with Himself  so that, just as God is the highest Being of  beings with respect to Deity, so 
this man assumed by God is the highest creature among creatures and the end or purpose (finis) 
of  all creatures—«sed si Deus est incarnatus, videlicet, quod Deus sibi univerit hominem ita ut, 
sicut Deus est summum ens entium quoad Deitatem, sic ille assumptus a Deo sit summa creatura 
creaturarum et finis omnium creaturarum» (ibid.: 24 (401)). 
Beyond the customary points of  Lullian Christology (e.g. the supremacy of  Christ’s humanity, the 
theme of  Christ as the final cause of  creation, etc.), we also notice the presence of  certain potentially 
problematic assertions regarding the hypostatic union as far as the admittedly fluid notion of  
medieval Christological orthodoxy is concerned. For a start, Llull’s reference to the fact that «Deus 
sibi univerit hominem» appears to go against a particular powerful strand of  the medieval tradition 
which carefully stated that God united to Himself  a human nature alone rather than a man on the 
grounds that the human nature may be considered an individual substance or «thing» whereas a 
«man» can only be considered a hypostasis or person, and that to posit two hypostases in Christ is 
to commit the heresy of  Nestorianism.9 Secondly, to refer to Christ as a «creature»—and even as 
the «summa creatura creaturarum»—although consonant with certain tones of  Franciscan thought, 
could be considered controversial in the context of  scholastic debates insofar as it appears to treat 
Christ, the man God, as simply a creature (i.e. without respect to his divine nature and Personhood), 
and medieval thinkers hotly debated whether Christ could be considered to have even been «made» 
or «created» (Lombard 2010: 44-47 [English]; Lombard 1971-81: 77-78). Peter Lombard was such 
a thinker, and in the first chapter of  his Libri sententiarum, Book III, he determines that Christ was 
neither made nor is a creature; in Chapter Two he clarifies that to speak thus of  Christ is to talk 
figuratively, but that, more correctly, one should add that he is made or is a creature according to the 
flesh or according to his humanity. Some of  the debates to which Llull may have been responding during 
this period could have been prompted by the metaphysical implications arising from the writings of  
Henry of  Ghent, Giles of  Rome, William of  Ware, Godfrey of  Fontaines and, of  course, Thomas 
Aquinas (cf. Cross 2002: 237-96). What we should probably do, therefore, in considering Llull’s 
conduct in these cases, is to assume that he is using the term homo and creatura to refer exclusively 
to Christ’s human nature.
9 Cf. Lombard (2010: 41-42). For the Latin text of  Peter Lombard’s work, see Lombard (1971-81: 73). The question 
of  individuation in relation to Christ’s assumed (i.e. non-subsistent) nature and to his suppositum—as medieval writers 
called his hypostasis—or subsistent nature, is discussed in Cross (2002: 16-17), who also emphasises (ibid.: 20) the 
medieval tendency to detach the individuation of  the former from that of  the latter. The medieval claim that Christ’s 
human nature is a substance is complicated by the fact that «an obvious way of  distinguishing a person from a nature 
is by claiming that a person—and not a nature—is a substance» (ibid.: 2). Cross examines three types of  theory which 
attempt to explain the distinction between a person and an individual nature: esse theories of  subsistence; relation 
theories of  subsistence; and negation theories of  subsistence (ibid.: 237-309).
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The second work which makes reference to and reinforces Llull’s point regarding God’s Creation 
and Incarnation ad se ipsum is the Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam solubiles (1289; hereafter 
QADS), in Quaestio XXIX, where Llull poses the question of  whether the chief  purpose of  the 
Incarnation is divine manifestation and love or the redemption of  mankind. In his solution by 
Medium, to follow Llull’s full account, he expressly states that God, on account of  the greatness and 
goodness of  Creation, created us principally for His own benefit («ad se ipsum principaliter») rather 
than for our benefit above all else («non autem principaliter ad nosmet ipsos»), so that our creation 
should be in majority of  goodness, etc. In the same way, God, by assuming flesh, principally created 
that Man He assumed for Himself  («ad se ipsum») «& hoc in tantum principaliter, quod ratione 
principalitatis finis uniens eum in se ipso univit eum ad se ipsum» (Llull  1729b (1965): 50 (67)). 
From this we may safely conclude that God was principally incarnated for Himself  («propter se»), 
whence it follows that, if  He had become incarnate principally on our account («propter nos») 
then, by reason of  the greater and more principal purpose, he would have created us for ourselves. 
And so that conjunction or union of  deity and humanity is in majority and minority, in minority 
and majority, which is impossible, and against the condition of  Medium (or Middle) between God 
and Man, because also against the Beginning and the End (or purpose) of  that Medium.  From this, 
in turn, it follows that the main purpose of  the Incarnation is divine manifestation and love rather 
than our redemption (idem). The Bonaventurian flavour of  Llull’s considerations here is beyond 
dispute, given that for Bonaventure himself, in III Sent., d. 32, q. 5 ad 3, «[n]on enim Christus ad nos 
finaliter ordinatur, sed nos finaliter ordinamur ad ipsum» (Bonaventure 1882-1902: 706).
From the foregoing we can see two hierarchies of  ends or at least two aspects of  the same 
hierarchy at work: divine manifestation and love (viz. outward communication) is a superior end 
to redemption; and the divine end of  the Incarnation is superior to the human end. From the 
period leading up to the beginning of  the Ternary Phase onward, we can detect in Llull’s works, 
however, a desire to «close the circle», as it were, and to ensure that there are no interruptions to 
the Neoplatonic cyclical movement of  exitus a Deo and reditus ad Deum.
3.1. Prayer: To Whom or What does Christ pray?
A very short answer to this question—and one that would assume Llull’s close familiarity with 
DDN—would be to refer the reader to Chapter III, § 1, 680B, of  that work, wherein it is stated 
clearly that prayer is addressed to the Trinity (Pseudo-Dionysius 1987: 68). However, from the 
perspective of  modern theology, at least, Christ’s «mystery of  saving worship» (Schillebeeckx 1966: 
18-21, as cited in Dupuis 1994: 125)—a mystery that contains both descending and ascending 
movements—comprises, among other things, his acts of  prayer as divine-human mediator between 
God and man, but also as mediator between the Son of  Man (i.e. the Son of  God incarnate) and 
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God the Father.10 While Jacques Dupuis clearly states that Christ’s relationship to God in prayer is 
not in truth the relationship between his humanity and God per se, nor that between his humanity 
and the entire Trinity (Dupuis 1994: 126), but rather, as just stated, between the Son of  Man and 
God the Father, what we find in Llull’s writings is that the relationship of  Christ’s humanity to the 
divinity is, through the mediation (Medium) of  the Son of  God, specifically one between Christ as 
Man (and through him, all men) and the other two members of  the Trinity. The standard construal 
of  Christ’s relationship to the divinity in prayer derives from the opening words of  Christ’s prayer 
in Mk 14:36: «Abba, Father […]», and holds that it consists in a relation of  God the Son to God the 
Father (Marchel 1967; Marchel 1971; de la Potterie 1990: esp. 81, 84-88, 96, 100, 108). 
Llull also speaks of  the relationship of  mankind via the Man-God to God per se, not least in Ars 
ad faciendum et solvendum quaestiones (Lectura Artis inventivae et Tabulae generalis) (1294-5), Dist. III, Part 
I, q. 2, Quarta Quaestio E: «Quare est Incarnatio Dei?», § 3, Solutio: EFtF: 
Ratio, propter quam est Incarnatio, est, ut sapientia Dei possit scire medium inter Deum et 
creaturam, illo medio existente Homine Deo, nam, in quantum est homo, est medium inter 
Deum et alios homines; et in quantum est Deus Filius, est medium inter illum hominem et 
Deum Patrem et Deum Sanctum Spiritum et inter alios homines qui sunt de specie illius 
hominis (Llull 1729 (1965): 157 (516)).
We could possibly surmise on purely logically grounds that what is true of  the general relation 
between man and God should also hold true of  the relationship between ordinary men and God 
in prayer, the denizens of  Paradise referred to in the passage from Fèlix and God in prayer, and even 
and especially that between the Son of  Man and God/the Trinity in prayer, this latter being a very 
special case of  the general relation between Man and God. In fact, in a section specifically devoted 
to prayer of  a relatively late work, the Medicina de pecat (July 1300), we find evidence that man’s 
prayers are indeed addressed to the Trinity: Medicina de pecat, Part V, «D’oració» (Llull 1938: 166-
204), Ch. 2 «De oració de què», ll. 4865-73 (Llull 1938: 172; also available electronically at http://
www.rialc.unina.it/89.5.htm (page accessible 06/08/14)). Suffice it to say for now, however, that 
it is the relationship between God-as-man and God-as-God/the Trinity that Llull is referring to 
when he speaks of  «la natura humana» and «la natura divina» of  Christ (though it should be noted 
that he specifically refers only to Christ’s two natures, leaving it to be understood that these are 
found conjoined without confusion, alteration, division or separation in a single Person).11 Christ’s 
human nature is assumed into personal union with the Son of  God and therefore is «indirectly 
10 Here we should note that in DDN, III, 1: 680C what appears to be a divine descent in prayer is in fact an ascent 
by which ‘we are being lifted upward to that brilliance above, to the dazzling light of  those beams [i.e. of  the ‘kindly 
Rays of  God’]’ (Pseudo-Dionysius 1987: 68); cf. also John of  Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, III, 24: «Oratio est ascensus 
mentis in Deum» (John of  Damascus 1864: 1090D). For discussion of  Christ’s prayer in John of  Damascus, see Louth 
(2002 [2004]: 176-77).
11 The confession, formula or definition articulated at the Council of  Chalcedon (451 AD) specifies: «in two natures 
which undergo no confusion, no change, no division, no separation» (ἐν ννν ννννννν ἀνννννννν, ἀνννπννν, ἀννννννννν, 
ἀνννννννν—in duabus naturis inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter), as stated in Tanner, N. P. (1990: 86).
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assumed into the intratrinitarian relationships» (Dupuis 1994: 126.). This is why Llull can repeatedly 
assert that the Incarnation and the Trinity offer reciprocal proofs of  each other (Hughes 2005-06: 
25-30). It is, however, Christ’s human spiritual soul that acts as the bridge between his corporeal 
human nature and his Divinity (Hughes 2005-06: 13-14 and n. 29; 33), a point already made by 
Gregory Nazianzen in his Oratio 38.10 (1856: 321AC) and also alluded to by John of  Damascus in 
De fide orthodoxa, 6 (1864: 1006B).
3.2. Prayer and the will in Bonaventure; intercession in Peter Lombard:
As the above makes clear, although the passage from Fèlix we are considering seems to deal 
specifically and exclusively with the efficacy of  prayer and in particular with the prayers of  those 
one might expect to be answered most readily by God the Father, that is to say, the prayers of  
the God-man, Christ, and the most eminent dwellers in Paradise (Mary, the angels, archangels, 
martyrs and confessors), it also involves complex matters associated directly with the nature of  the 
hypostatic union and the communicatio idiomatum between Christ’s human and divine natures. Both 
the latter’s ascending aspect (human ν divine, through prayer) and its descending counterpart 
(divine ν human, through grace) are present. But, as we have specified and as Llull’s previously 
cited words from the Ars ad faciendum et solvendum quaestiones (Lectura Artis inventivae et Tabulae generalis) 
reveal, the mediation of  Christ in both directions operates at two levels. We should perhaps note 
here St Bonaventure’s distinctions of  the will as regards Christ’s prayer, a topic he discusses in d. 
17, a. 2, q. 1. ad 1 of  his Commentary on the Third Book of  Sentences (Bonaventure 1882-1902: 371; as 
cited and discussed in Hayes 2000 [1st ed. 1981]: 121 and note). He distinguishes between three 
different types of  will from which prayer may emerge: the rational will, the will of  piety and the 
will of  the flesh, only the first of  which will be answered in all cases by God since it conforms 
to the divine will. The second and third type, however, do not invariably conform thereto as far 
as their particular objects are concerned and thus are not always answered. (A comprehensive 
treatment of  Christ’s two wills in the context of  thirteenth-century scholasticism has been given by 
Corey Ladd Barnes (Barnes 2006).) Whether Llull was familiar with this commentary tradition is a 
separate matter, but what this brief  glance at Bonaventure’s work—admittedly very distant in genre 
terms from Llull’s proto-novel, Fèlix—does show is the vivid contrast between his hierarchised 
and sophisticated construal of  types of  will as applied to prayer and the relatively blunt and highly 
condensed portrayal in terms of  inoperative causal mechanisms given by Llull in the fragment in 
question to prayer itself. For orientation regarding the efficacy of  Christian prayer in general and 
the subjective efficacy of  Christ’s prayer, the reader would do well to consult Bernard (1967: 125-
64, 67-68, respectively).
Having mentioned the medieval commentary tradition on the Book of  Sentences, it might be instructive 
at this point to compare Llull’s treatment of  prayer in this instance with that presented by Peter 
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Lombard in Book IV, Distinction 45, Chapter 6 of  his Book of  Sentences.12 In his book, Peter Lombard, 
Philipp W. Rosemann describes Peter’s approach to the question of  the intercession of  the angels 
and saints to whom we direct our prayers as involving «a reconciliation of  religious practice with 
doctrinal truth» (Rosemann 2004: 184), in the sense that «[i]n the Book of  Sentences, theological 
theory does not simply overrule religious practice; it elucidates and—where necessary—gently 
corrects it» (Rosemann 2004: 185). We should note, first, that the parallel with the Lullian example 
is not direct, insofar as in the latter case it is Christ’s human nature which, in conjunction with—as 
I argue—the denizens of  Paradise, namely, Mary, the angels, archangels, martyrs and confessors, 
address their prayers to Christ’s divine nature, i.e. the divine essence of  God. In the Lombardian 
case, therefore, the angels and saints are apparent addressees of  prayer (for intercessory purposes), 
whereas in the Lullian case they are addressers of  prayer. However, in the former case, God is not 
informed of  our supplications by the angels and saints; quite the reverse: it is He who informs 
them, being, after all, omniscient.13 
As Peter, in fact, states in his Libri sententiarum, Book 4, Dist. 45, Ch. 6, no. 2: «the angels are even 
said to offer our prayers and vows to God, not because they inform him of  them, but because 
they seek his will over these matters» / «Unde et dicuntur angeli orationes et vota nostra offerre 
Deo, non quia eum doceant, sed quia eius voluntatem super eis consultunt» (Lombard 2010: 248 
[English]; Lombard 1971-81: 527 [Latin]). Quoting Augustine, the Lombard stresses that « “an 
angel is not said to offer our prayers to God in the sense that God would then know what we 
wish and what we need,”14 since he knows all things before they are done, just as he knows them 
afterwards» / « “Non ergo dicitur angelus orationes nostras offerre Deo, quasi Deus tunc noverit 
quid velimus et quo indigeamus”, quia omnia antequam fiant, sicut et postea quam facta sunt novit» 
(Lombard 2010: 249 [English]; Lombard 1971-81: 528 [Latin]). Following Augustine again, the 
Lombard holds that when the angels are said to «announce» certain things to God, this should be 
read as their consulting Him as to His will. The saints, in the Lombard’s view, replicate the role of  
the angels in this respect in their relation to God.
Against the commonly held, or «naïve», position according to which the angels and saints simply 
intercede on our behalf  before God, as equally against the rigid theological doctrine of  God’s 
omniscience, Peter presents the qualified view that «God is said to grant the prayers of  some not 
only when he grants them their effect, but also when he allows the court of  angels and holy souls 
to know what is or is not going to happen with regard to them» / «Deus dicitur audire preces 
12 I refer to the edition given in Lombard (1971-81).
13 For an interesting discussion of  the Classical Latin sense of  «intercessio», as well as religious intercession in the Old 
and New Testaments, in which latter Christ features as «l’intercesseur parfait», see Bernard (1967: 73-75).
14 Augustine’s text in Epistola 140 (ad Honoratum), Ch. 29, no. 69, in Augustine (1841-64: 568), actually reads: «sed sicut 
annuntiant angeli, non solum nobis beneficia Dei, verum etiam illi preces nostras [...] non ut tunc Deus noverit quid 
velimus, vel quo indigeamus».
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quorundam non solum quando effectui mancipat, sed etiam quando innotescit curiae angelorum 
et sanctarum animarum quid inde futurum sit vel non» (idem). So, the angels and saints effectively 
intercede for us via their merits and their sympathy or affection, so long as they are supportive of  
our wishes and are privy to the fact that such wishes are in accordance with God’s will. A posteriori, 
then, if  the angels will our good, so must God too.
 What is there to learn from this comparison between Peter Lombard and Ramon Llull? It 
would seem that the Lullian quotation which we are discussing, namely, that in which 
[el resclús] se maravellá com podia esser que Deus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui 
pregava per son poble la natura divina, ni per que no exoya santa Maria et tant an gel, archangel, 
martir et confessor qui ha en parays, qui tots preguen que lo mon fos bo et en bon estament
need not necessarily reflect the opinion of  the historical Ramon Llull himself. On one level, these 
words simply register what the narrator of  an exemplaristic fictional narrative peppered with 
meravelles or «wonders» attributes as thoughts to a character therein, namely, the recluse. However, 
the recluse’s sense of  wonder in this instance strikes the reader as being genuinely felt and in need 
of  some satisfactory response or answer. In fact, this meravella seems to correspond to the kind 
of  dubium which Llull in his Ternary Arts might seek to resolve initially at least by means of  the 
question Utrum?, which, though it is not the case here, would convert this matter into an authentic 
example of  the Scholastic quaestio. What’s more, however, the very content of  the recluse’s sense 
of  wonder, or what he is wondering «at», also seems worthy of  its being expressed in literary form 
and, further, of  being taken seriously by the reader, as well as the author. 
Given that the quotation occurs in a work of  fiction with a strong moral and pastoral purpose 
and a «popular» readership in mind, it should come as no surprise that what Llull presents to 
us comes closer to what Rosemann’s reading of  Peter Lombard would call the «naïve view» of  
the intercessory role of  the angels and saints, with the proviso that it is not just «man» who is 
praying to God, but Christ’s human nature (along with Mary, the angels and saints etc.) that is 
praying to its divine counterpart. This in itself  presupposes a certain view of  the hypostatic union, 
and one which, in fact, in this particular passage opts to omit reference to the Person of  Christ, 
i.e. the Person in whom these two natures are united, namely, the Son of  God, completely. The 
greatest contrast, perhaps, between the Lombardian view and that expressed here by Llull is that, 
although Christ and the angels and saints are seen in both as acting in man’s interest, given the right 
conditions, in the former case this situation is predicated on the presence and activity of  prayerful 
members of  the faithful, while in the latter, and far less optimistic, case the prayerful activities of  a 
people whose faith is strongly in doubt are in fact absent. It is the prayers of  Christ’s human nature, 
of  the angels and saints, which seem to occupy the void established by human neglect of  God.
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3.3. Types of  prayer: Biblical precedent and Aquinas:
In the rather bleak view proposed by Llull, mankind fails to direct prayers to God, so preoccupied 
is he with worldly affairs. Neither Christ in his glorified humanity nor the angels and saints in 
their glory feature as the objects of  man’s upwardly-directed prayer, that is to say, as objects who 
intercede. Quite the opposite: Christ in his humanity, the angels and saints, appeal to the divinity so 
that «lo mon fos bo et en bon estament», the goodness of  the world and of  its continuing condition 
depending here not on the divine attribute of  God’s diffusive «Goodness» but on man’s ability and 
willingness to respond well thereto, namely, in a faithful Christian fashion. (I am assuming here that 
Christ is included here in those who pray alongside Mary, the angels and saints for this particular 
purpose.) What is particularly odd, however, about the construal offered by the  narrator of  the 
recluse’s thoughts and doubts is that it expresses a complete scission between God’s human nature 
in Christ and the will associated therewith and the divine nature and its associated will in the Person 
of  the Son of  God. In the medieval period in particular, and in spite of  Christ’s apparent divided 
wills as shown in Luke 22:42—«Saying: Father, if  thou wilt, remove this chalice from me: but 
yet not my will, but thine be done», Douai-Rheims Version. Cf. also Mark 14:36—and Matthew 
26:39—«And going a little further, he fell upon his face, praying, and saying: My Father, if  it be 
possible, let this chalice pass from me. Nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt», Douai-Rheims 
Version; cf. also Mt 26:42—, tradition asserted that the two wills of  Christ, divine and human, 
were—at least with regard to the latter’s rational aspect—in total harmony; or in other words, that 
Christ as man could not wish for something that as God he would not grant. When considering the 
question of  the appropriateness of  prayer in Christ, Aquinas states, in fact, in his Summa theologiae, 
III, q. 21, a. 1 co. that a prerequisite for such consists in the very existence of  two wills in Him. He 
states:
oratio est quaedam explicatio propriae voluntatis apud Deum, ut eam impleat. Si igitur in 
Christo esset una tantum voluntas, scilicet divina, nullo modo sibi competeret orare, quia 
voluntas divina per seipsam est effectiva eorum quae vult [….] Sed quia in Christo est alia 
voluntas divina et alia humana; et voluntas humana non est per seipsam efficax ad implendum 
ea quae vult, nisi per virtutem divinam, inde est quod Christo, secundum quod est homo et 
humanam voluntatem habens, competit orare (Aquinas 1980a: 803).
Aquinas, in fact, goes on to assert that «inter alia quae Christus scivit futura, scivit quaedam esse 
fienda propter suam orationem. Et huiusmodi non inconvenienter a Deo petiit» (idem), in relation 
to which Corey Ladd Barnes has commented that here Christ’s prayer «exemplifies the role of  
secondary causality. The Scriptum [super libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi] considers Christ’s 
instrumental causality wholly in terms of  secondary causality (whether dispositive or meritorious)» 
(Barnes 2006: 332-36, here 333), whereas in the Summa theologiae Aquinas attributes efficient 
instrumental causality to Christ. Barnes concludes, therefore, that in his early writings Aquinas, 
«following his contemporaries, limited the causality of  Christ’s human nature to dispositive and 
meritorious modes» (Barnes 2006: 343 and n. 757).
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4. The Hypostatic union: The soul-body analogy and the Antiochene/Alexandrian divide:
Returning to our theme, however, the nature of  the hypostatic union is a topic frequently discussed 
by Llull, and one frequently discussed at some length, not least in LC, Book V, Chapter 337: «Com 
hom adora e contempla la sancta gloriosa humana natura de nostre Senyor Jhesu Christ», (Llull 
1906-14 / ORL VII: 264ff), where it is demonstrated, to use Llull’s term, by analogy with the union 
of  body and soul in created beings (e.g. § 12). This analogy has a long history, and was used in 
the context of  Patristic theology by writers on both sides of  the Antiochene/Alexandrian divide, 
writers including Gregory of  Nyssa (c. 330/35-c.395), Gregory Nazianzen (c. 329-389/90), Cyril of  
Alexandria (c.376-444), Severus of  Antioch (465-538 (?)), Leontius of  Byzantium (c.485-c.543) and 
John of  Damascus (c.675/6-749) as well as St Augustine (354-430) himself. Gregory Nazianzen’s 
forging of  this analogy can be found in his Epistle 101, where the author states that «quamvis 
enim duae naturae sint Deus et homo, quippe qui anima sit et corpus» (Gregory Nazianzen 1862: 
180A). The Cyrillian use of  this analogy has been treated by Donald Fairbairn (Fairbairn 2006 [1st 
ed. 2003]: 116-19), and a fuller account is given by Steven A. McKinion (McKinion 2000: 188-96). 
Sarah Coakley also makes reference to the use of  this analogy (Coakley 2002: 143-63, here 147) as 
does Brian E. Daley (Daley: 164-96, here 176, 184).
Interestingly, in Book 3, Chapter 3 of  his De fide orthodoxa, John of  Damascus specifically warns 
against treating Christ’s composita natura «neque ex aliis aliud» (1864: 990A), the examples he gives 
being «quemadmodum ex anima et corpora hominem, aut ex quatuor elementis» (idem), namely, as 
we shall see, the precise terms Ramon Llull uses for his analogy with the hypostatic union. He goes 
on to reiterate this point later in the same chapter when he states that: «[h]inc sit, in Domino nostro 
Jesu Christo natura una dicenda non sit, ut eodem modo de Christo qui ex deitate et humanitate 
compositus est, loquamur, veluti de individuo quod corpora et anima constat» (John of  Damascus 
1864: 994A), for the reason that Christ cannot be considered an individual, lacking, as he does, the 
common species of  Christitas (cf. also John of  Damascus 1864: 1066A).
Particular reference is made in LC, Book V, Chapter 337 § 15 to the exact nature of  the communicatio 
idiomatum, as well as, negatively, to what it cannot be understood to be. Llull, in what continues to 
be a seemingly Antiochene construal of  the hypostatic union and the communicatio idiomatum, is keen 
to emphasise the distinction of  natures in Christ, that is to say, between his deity (here, using the 
embryonic Alphabet, represented as A) and his humanity (here, C), and to stress the specificity of  
their respective properties to each— «predicant la M (human speech) una cosa de la A (Deity) e 
altra cosa de la C (humanity of  Christ)» (Llull 1906-14 / ORL VIII: 268). By way of  an excursus 
and dramatic summary, Antiochene Christology tended to assert the assumption of  full humanity 
(i.e. body and soul) on the part of  the Son of  God along with a clear distinction between his natures, 
the communication of  properties between them being restricted, whereas the Alexandrian school 
supposed the divine Person’s assumption of  mere flesh alone and asserted Christ’s fundamental 
unity and a more open communication of  properties. In a highly condensed summary, F. LeRon 
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Shults has pointed to the relative differences between the Antiochene and Alexandrian positions 
and the risks, at the extremes of  each, of  sliding into Nestorianism or Eutychian monophysitism, 
respectively (F. LeRon Shults 2008: 24-28, 32-33). Further study of  Llull’s position on the hypostatic 
union might take the foregoing into account, as also the three theories of  the Incarnation (i.e. the 
assumptus homo theory, the subsistence theory and the habitus theory) discussed in Peter Lombard’s 
tertium Librum sententiarum, Dist. VI, (Lombard 1971-81: 49-59).
That there is evidence of  at least one significant similarity between theologians of  the Antiochene 
tradition and Ramon Llull with respect to their conceptions of  the hypostatic union, can be seen in 
the fact that both Theodore of  Mopsuestia (c. 350-428) and Theodoret of  Cyrus (c.393-c.457) both 
refer only to the «conjunction» (νννννννν) of  natures in Christ (Daley 2002: 179, 181, respectively), 
a term Cyril of  Alexandria (c.376-444) strongly rejected on the grounds that it failed sufficiently 
to indicate the union (ibid.: 179), while Llull himself  specifies in his Liber de Trinitate et Incarnatione 
(Sept. 1305) that this union exists as a conjunction rather than a composition of  natures (Llull 
1984: 118), stating in the slightly later Ars compendiosa Dei (May 1308) that Christ’s purpose itself  
is this very conjunction: «Per primam speciem quartae regulae quaeritur: Quare est Christus?  Et 
respondendum est, quod est per hoc, quia natura divina est cum natura humana coniuncta» (Llull 
1985a: 228). 
We should note, nevertheless, that this late position of  Llull’s on the question of  the «composition» 
or «conjunction» of  natures in Christ differs markedly from his much earlier statements—in LPT, 
III, «De uiginti quaestionibus», q. 5: «Quaestio: Si humanitas Iesu Christi existit in totu D ipsius C et 
in toto B?»—to the effect that Christ «est M (i.e. the Principle of  compostion) ipsius A (i.e. God), et 
creaturae» and that «compositum autem, hoc est, Iesus Christus est unum in persona» (Llull 2007: 
137). Such a difference provides strong evidence for a dramatic shift over time in Llull’s Christology. 
Llull’s position is rendered more problematic, however, by the fact that a few questions later in the 
same text from which these last quotations are taken, Llull explicitly refers to the conjunction of  
Christ’s human nature with Deitas (i.e. the divine nature), even while using as an analogy the manner 
in which the body’s form causes the simple elements to relinquish (amittunt in forma corporis) their 
simple forms in the process of  becoming composite within the body’s form, itself  thereby being 
composite. On the one hand, this conceptualisation clearly indicates the relevance of  hylomorphic 
theories to Llull’s construal of  the hypostatic union, and, on the other, it reveals that Llull, at least 
in this work, may not be exercising the fullest terminological precision when considering that 
union in the light of  either conjunctio or compositio or at least may only be using the latter in a broad 
sense (or one in which the terms are not mutually exclusive). Perhaps we should also bear in mind 
here the important distinction concerning the hypostatic union made by John of  Damascus (1864: 
990A) that a thing can be composite in the sense that it consists of  different parts which retain 
their difference rather in that of  any such difference being dissolved in the formation of  a new or 
third thing. Whatever the case, we read, again in LPT, III, «De uiginti quaestionibus», q. 10, that: 
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natura humana [Christi] potest esse persona per se in coniunctione deitatis [i.e. when 
conjoined with Deity], sicut elementa simplicia, quae proprias formas simplices amittunt in 
forma corporis, ubi composita existunt, quae est forma ab ipsis composita, idcirco humanitas 
Christi, quae naturam habet personae [i.e. which has the nature of  a person], potest esse una 
persona cum Filio ipsius A, qui per se persona existit (Llull 2007: 140). 
Here, despite Llull’s emphasis on the singularity of  Persons in Christ, there seems to be some room 
for misinterpretation along Nestorian lines, given his dual assertions to the effect that «natura humana 
[Christi] potest esse persona per se» and that the Son of  God «per se persona existit». Unless we 
read this passage very carefully, there is also a suggestion that Christ himself  might be considered 
a person or even a Person. The relevance of  Llull’s Avicebronian brand of  hylomorphism needs to 
be examined in any comprehensive account of  Llull’s Christology which focuses on his use of  the 
soul-body analogy with regard to the hypostatic union, though interestingly Llull himself  seems 
not always to make reference thereto when invoking this analogy. Llull, however, gives his own 
brief  account of  the hylomorphism contemporary to the composition of  Fèlix in QADS, q. 72, 
«Quomodo anima sit conjuncta corpori?» (Llull 1729b: 88 (105)). For an extended treatment of  
Llull’s hylomorphism, see Bordoy (2006: 364-416). Llull’s hylomorphic theories are also discussed 
at some length by Marta Romano in Lullus (2008: 369-74). 
 It should be noted, however, that compositionalist accounts of  the Incarnation are by no 
means necessarily or even invariably heterodox and represent a relational-concretist rather than a 
transformationalist-abstractist approach to the hypostatic union, as can be gathered from Jonathan 
Hill and, separately, Oliver D. Crisp (Marmodoro & Hill 2011: 1-19; 45-66).
 Two questions later in this same text, namely, LPT, III, «De uiginti quaestionibus», q. 12, 
the analogies—and I call them analogies on account of  the sic…sicut…et sicut…construction of  the 
sentence in question—analogies themselves governed by the metaphora presented at the beginning 
of  Question 5, are extended to include the supernatural union of  God and man via the Incarnation, 
the co-presence of  God and man in the sacrament of  the Eucharist under the form of  bread, and 
the Virtus (H) and Operatio (D) of  the human intellective soul under the form of  a mobile animated 
body (Llull 2007: 141).
 
4.1. The soul-body analogy in a number of  Ramon Llull’s writings:
We shall now take a closer look at several of  Llull’s works:
4.1.1. Llibre de contemplació en Déu (1273-4?):
As, for the moment, in LC we will be dealing with Ramon Llull’s emerging alphabetical notation, it 
will help the reader to see the full table of  alphabetised concepts germane to this chapter.
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Table 2: Alphabetised concepts from LC, Book IV, Ch. 337.
A Deity H Nature of  soul of  Peter
B Divine power (virtut) I Body of  Peter
C Humanity of  Jesus Christ K Nature of  body of  Peter
D Human power (virtut) L Human understanding
E Jesus Christ M Human speech
F Peter N Prayer and contemplation
G Soul of  Peter
The analogy used by Llull here (i.e. the comparison between the union of  soul and body in man and 
the hypostatic union in Christ), however, is powerfully mediated by a further analogy: that existing 
between B (divine power) and D (human power), on the one hand, and that existing between H 
(the nature of  Peter’s soul) and K (the nature of  Peter’s body), on the other, the former paralleling a 
fortiori the latter (i.e. BD > HK). By way of  an aside, it should be mentioned that the entire purpose 
of  this chapter, not to mention of  LC itself, is to endorse anything which corresponds to—and to 
facilitate—N (prayer and contemplation). This further analogy is of  significance for it is by virtue 
of  H and K, on the one hand, that FG and I (Peter, Peter’s soul and Peter’s body, respectively) 
enjoy existence, as also of  B and D, on the other, that E (Jesus Christ) consists of  A (Deity) and C 
(humanity of  Jesus Christ) (Llull 1906-14 / ORL VIII: 269). 
It is worth noting in this respect, however, that St Bonaventure specifically rejects the soul-body 
analogy for the hypostatic union on the grounds that since it expresses «a union between two 
elements which have a natural ordering to each other for the purpose of  constituting a nature 
which is simply identical with neither of  its constitutive elements» or, in other words, since that 
union is conceived of  a constituting «some new third nature», the Apollinarian heresy, a form of  
monophysitism, would thereby raise its head once again (cf. Hayes 2000 [1st ed. 1981]: 74, 76). 
Bonaventure’s actual words—in III Sent., d. 6, a. 2, q. 1. resp.—are that «[q]uaedam vero est unio, 
in qua non est unitorum transmutatio, sed tertiae naturae constitutio; et hoc est, quia unibilia non 
habent repugnantiam, habent autem mutuam dependentiam, sicut uniuntur corpus et anima ad 
constitutionem hominis» (Bonaventure 1882-1902: 158). It is this «third nature» and the sense of  
essential dependence that Bonaventure seeks to override in his quest for an analogy suited to the 
hypostatic union.
As the reader will have noticed, there is at least an apparent asymmetry or inequality within the 
hypostatic union as regards the relative eminence of  the two conjoined natures (see pp. 163-164 
of  the current article, however). And although LC is far from being a work of  formal apologetics, 
it is nonetheless true that to those not convinced of  the truth of  the Catholic faith, as well as to 
Ramon Llull himself, the fact of  this asymmetry represented a major obstacle to their potential—
and by Llull much desired—conversion to Christianity—e.g. DFI, Part IV, §§ 2, 5 co. (Llull 1729a: 
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23, 25 (400, 402)). It might also seem to have posed a conundrum to sceptical Catholics whose 
faith was wavering. Llull, in this work, however, makes it perfectly clear that this is an integral part 
of  the faith in which he believes and which he has no desire to conceal, stating in Book IV, Ch. 
337, § 2 that «en axí la L (human understanding) entén que en la E (Jesus Christ) molt major es 
sens comparacio la B (divine power) que la D (human power), com sia B creador e D creatura» 
(Llull 1906-14 / ORL VIII: 270). Although at the time of  writing LC, Llull may not yet have had 
access to Burgundio of  Pisa’s translation of  John of  Damascus’s De fide orthodoxa, he may well have 
had such access during his subsequent stay in Paris (1287-89), although his clear endorsement of  
the aforementioned asymmetry at this early stage already reveals similarities with the Damascene 
in this respect. Here, the reader is directed to Andrew Louth’s discussion of  John of  Damascus’s 
«asymmetrical» Christology (Louth 2002 [2004]: 162-63; 174-75). 
Again here we note the presence of  a potential and actual interruption to the circulation to which 
Llull seeks to attest within the movements of  descent/ascent, influentia/refluentia (these latter being 
terms first introduced by Llull in the Compendium seu commentum Artis demonstrativae (1289)—(Llull 
1722: 77-78 (369-70))—, a work almost exactly contemporary with Fèlix), and the divine and 
human ends or intentions of  creation and (through the Incarnation) recreation. The circulation to 
which I refer is brought out particularly well, in the context of  an Aristotelian-inspired definition 
of  God as the unmoved mover («Deus igitur est immobilis, et ipse est motor omnium finitorum et 
principatorum»), in QADS, q. 167, «Quomodo Deus moveat omnia?», (Llull 1729b: 166-67 (183-
84)), as is the role played therein by Christ’s Incarnation and Passion: «Praeterea est alius modus 
movendi inter Deum et creaturam, videlicet, quod Deus sit incarnatus et passus secundum carnem 
propter nos: et ita ipsa movet quod moveamus nos ad multum honorandum et diligendum eum ex toto 
nostro posse», (ibid.: 167 (184); emphasis added). From the time of  Fèlix onward, if  not before, 
however, Llull progressively seeks to counteract and override any such interruption by emphasising 
in his mature works the superlative nature—or Primacy—of  Christ, his human nature included, 
that nature being conceived maximally in order to achieve this desired goal (i.e. full circulation). 
At least four primary sources of  interruption can be found in: a) the ontological gap between the 
created and uncreated, the finite and the infinite—which is unavoidable; 2) Original Sin—which is 
accidental, in the Aristotelian as well as Pseudo-Dionysian sense (cf. DDN, Ch. 4, §§ 31 and esp. 
32; 732C-733A); 3) the existence of  non-Christians—which is undeniable yet can be remedied by 
conversion; 4) and the lack of  faith found in supposed Christians, which manifests itself  as actual 
sin (i.e. the fact that humanity does not practise virtue and avoid vice), and is subject to Llull’s 
reforming impulse. What we find, however, in the quotation from Fèlix is that there appears to be 
an interruption as regards the bestowal by God of  His grace upon man. How should we explain 
this?
Apart from the fact that a distinction should be drawn between God’s general presence in creation 
and his specific presence in Christ, a further distinction clearly exists between Christ’s salvific role 
as redeemer or recreator, a role in which he brings about the remission of  generalised original sin 
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and which Llull is consistent in asserting throughout his years of  writerly production, and Christ’s 
ability to remit actual sin in specific individuals or communities through his prayers and active 
mediation. For if  man does not perform good works, but rather commits evil deeds and acts to the 
disservice of  God, that is to say, if  he fails to practise the virtues and to avoid vice, if  he fails to 
honour God and worship Christ, if  he inverts the two intentions, then, for Llull perhaps, though 
man is all the more in need of  Christ’s prayers, he cannot expect Christ’s agency through prayer as 
intercessor for mankind to be as efficacious or even forthcoming as if  he had in fact carried out 
all those things in the desired manner—see LC, Ch. 338, § 1 (Llull 1906-14 / ORL VIII: 273ff).
A possible explanation for the Fèlix quotation, therefore, would be that as a result of  man’s failure 
to remember, understand, love, honour and praise God through His Son incarnate, his failures 
vis-à-vis the virtues and vices, and his failure to affirm the Incarnation and to offer prayers to God 
(all of  which are implied in the behaviour of  the people observed by the recluse in the passage 
from Fèlix), Christ’s human nature is less able to communicate with his divine nature (at least 
through prayer), his capacity to intercede on our behalf  is vitiated and divine grace is, therefore, 
less forthcoming or not forthcoming at all. God, of  course, is not obliged to answer any prayer, from 
whomever it may come. Man indeed has to collaborate if  he wishes to receive divine aid (yet even 
then it is not guaranteed). He has to act virtuously, avoid vice, affirm the Incarnation and enable 
this to be signified to his memory, intellect and will, all for the sake of  increasing prayer to and 
contemplation of  God. Before quoting a passage, which contains alphabetical notation, where the 
above is stated explicitly, I present the reader with the full table of  correspondences between letters 
and concepts: 
Table 3: Alphabetised concepts from LC, Book IV, Ch. 338.
A God’s aid F Signification of  D
B Doing good G Signification of  E
C Doing evil H Memory, understanding, will
D Affirmation of  the Incarnation I Prayer and contemplation
E Negation of  the Incarnation
The passage, from LC again—Ch. 338, § 10—reads as follows: 
e aitant com la H (memory, understanding and will) reeb de so que la F (signification of  D) li 
mostra de la D (affirmation of  the Incarnation), d’aitant ha la A (divine aid) raó que ajut a la 
H com fassa la B (doing good) e que no fassa la C (doing evil) per tal que aja en si la I (prayer 
and contemplation) (Llull 1906-14 / ORL VIII: 276). 
We should note here, in passing, the mediating role played by signification with respect to the 
affirmation of  the Incarnation to the human intellective soul (cf. Gayà 1995).
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A later section of  the same chapter—LC, Ch. 338, § 24—deals specifically with the assistance 
offered to humanity to do good and avoid evil by the saints in heaven who enable man all the better 
to pray to God for mercy. This goal is achieved more effectively on the basis that the affirmation of  
the Incarnation is signified to the powers of  the human soul than that its contrary (the negation of  
the Incarnation) is so signified. A very similar list of  intercessors is given here to the one presented 
in Fèlix, intercessors whose aid is secured by means of  the aforementioned signification: 
la F (signification of  D) se fa a avant e demostra ab la D (affirmation of  the Incarnation) 
que vostra humana natura e nostra dona Sancta Maria e los apostols e molts sents e martirs 
e confessors e religiosos ha en Gloria qui tots ajuden a pregar per nosaltres peccadors (Llull 
1906-14 / ORL VIII: 280-81).
Again it is to be noted that Mary, the apostles and saints, etc., feature alongside Christ’s human 
nature in the above list of  those conjoined in the activity of  prayer for sinful man.
4.1.2. Liber principiorum theologiae (1274-83):
Turning now to LPT, we see that Llull again has recourse to what he now calls the «metaphor» 
of  the human person’s union of  body and soul in order to demonstrate the relation between 
Christ’s humanity and his divinity. In order to show the full functioning of  Llull’s arguments, I now 
reproduce the table showing the alphabetised concepts used within this work, some of  which will 
feature in the text below:
Table 4: Alphabetised concepts from LPT, III, «De uiginti quaestionibus».
B Divine essence F Precepts K Love (Dilectio) O Supposition
C Dignities G Sacraments L Simplicity P Exposition
D Operation H Power (Virtus) M Composition Q First Intention
E Articles I Cognition N Order R Second Intention
The hierarchy that subordinates the virtus (or power) of  the body to that of  the soul illustrates for 
Llull how, though specifically composite as regards his two natures, the D C B (operation, Dignities, 
Divine essence) in Christ’s one Person are greater than his humanity, in which humanity, Llull goes 
on, is all the D of  C B, insofar as the Son of  A (not included in the table, but here God) is by all 
D C B one with (his) humanity. Thus there is a hierarchy in Christ, in this particular case not so 
much between his two natures as between his human nature and his divine Personhood.15 For this 
15 In the Llibre de demostracions (1274-76), Book IV, Ch. 1, § 6, though with a different emphasis, Llull had already made 
use of  the analogy between the soul’s superiority over the body, insofar as the soul is the body’s form, as well as the 
superiority of  the body over the elements, insofar as it is composed of  matter, form and their conjunction, which 
elements themselves organise the earliest «prime matter» («la primera ordial materia»), and the way in which the Son 
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reason, the Person of  the Son can be said to be outside or beyond (extra) humanity through the 
infinity of  D in C B. Interestingly, Llull states that Christ’s human nature consists of  the red triangle 
(from Figure T: Beginning, Middle, End)—or, in other words, that it is subject to normal temporal 
causality—yet that D C B lie outside that triangle, these being, ad intra at least, eternal and without 
cause, and mutually convertible, the latter insofar as D is equally present in C and B.16
What Llull is trying to do here is to account for the union or conjunction of  two natures in one 
Person, that is to say, of  the created and the uncreated, the finite and the infinite, while seeming 
to indicate that infinitude resides ultimately in the divine Person (rather than the divine nature) 
from whom it radiates dynamically via the operation (D) of  the Dignities (C) which characterise 
and define the Divine essence (B) in its internal and external activities. Llull’s final, subtle answer 
to the question posed (namely, «Utrum humanitas Jesu Christi sit in toto D ipsius C et in toto B?») 
is that the Son of  God in Christ (a conjunction of  creature and Creator) is infinite by all of  D C 
B, though that humanity may not exist throughout the D of  CB. The bi-directional movement, 
therefore, in the figure of  Christ is clearly weaker in its ascending aspect. This inequality thus goes 
some way to explaining the ontological and operational gap between the finite and the infinite 
which, in the relevant passage from Fèlix, at least, seems unsusceptible of  being bridged (Llull 
2007: 137). Elsewhere I have argued that in Llull’s later works his general tendency is to minimise 
as far as possible in and through Christ, the man God, the existential and metaphysical gap between 
the infinite and the finite, the uncreated and the created. This tendency can be seen in the Llibre de 
demostracions, Ch. 23, «De causa formali», § 3, where Llull states «cor de necessitat se cové que enfre 
forma infinida e finida, aja major conveniencia que enfre forma i materia qui son coses finides» 
(Llull 1930: 509 [Catalan]; Llull 1722a (1965): 207 (384) [Latin]). This last quotation is also of  
of  God is the perfection of  the humanity He assumed («complement a la humanitat que près»). According to Llull, 
«per la participació d aquella persona divina infinida e la participació de la humana natura, es feta unió de amdues les 
natures». Stressing the supremacy of  Christ’s created nature, Llull states that Christ’s being is «major e pus noble, sens 
tota comparació, en bonea, poder etc., que no es tot l autre be creat. On, axí con lo teu cors es altre qui no es los .iiij. 
elements e ha més noblea que no han los .iiij. elements, e assò per la participació de la anima, enaxí la humana natura de 
Jhesu Crist es més a ensús que no es tota la humana especia ni que tot l autre be creat» and proof  that God is capable 
of  creating «una pus nobla creatura que totes les altres creatures» and «.j. be major que tots los altres bens» (Llull 1930: 
417 [Catalan]; Llull 1722a (1965): 167-68 (344-45) [Latin]).
16 See LPT, III, «De uiginti quaestionibus», q. 5 (Llull 2007: 137), and, in particular, q. 1: «Si D foret in C, et non in 
B, existeret in C per Q (First Intention), et in C foret B per R (Second Intention). Hoc autem est contra H L in C B» 
(ibid.: 135). As I mentioned in a previous article (Hughes 2005: 281-296, here p. 282, n. 9), and seems worth repeating, 
in Ad Thalassium 22, Maximus the Confessor describes Christ as the beginning, middle, and end of  all the ages (i.e. of  
all creation). Cf. Maximus the Confessor, Ad Thalassium 22, in Maximus the Confessor (2003: 117). It is worth noting, 
in passing, that after he had translated and then revised his translation of  the Pseudo-Dionysius’ works under the given 
title Versio operum sancti Dionysii Areopagitae, John Scotus Eriugena also translated Maximus’ Ambigua ad Ioannem (as Versio 
sancti Maximi Confessoris Ambigua ad lohannem) as well as his Ambigua ad Thalassium (as Versio sancti Maximi Confessoris 
Quaestiones ad Thalassium). Eriugena thus provides a possible conduit to Ramon Llull of  Maximus’—not to mention 
the Pseudo-Dionysius’—thought while Llull was in Paris between 1287-89, Ad Thalassium 22 and 60 being particularly 
important in this regard.
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clear relevance to Llull’s construal of  the hypostatic union, and shows that this construal is causal, 
formal, and «hylomorphic» in however broad a sense, given that, by definition, there can be no such 
thing as «materia infinida e finida» and that there is an evident superiority in the relation between 
«forma infinida e finida»—i.e. between the divine and the human soul in Christ, the soul being the 
body’s form—over that which pertains to «forma i materia», in whatever way the two elements in 
each dyad may be conjoined.  
Despite the above conclusion, Llull goes on to assert in the following question («Utrum humana 
natura Jesu Christi sit in Filio istius A (God) per Q (first intention) et in Persona Patris et Sancti 
Spiritus per R (second intention), cum Pater et Sanctus Spiritus non assumpserint humanam 
naturam?») that the operation of  the Dignities is equally infinitely in Q without R in the Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit, and therefore that it is impossible for the humanity of  Christ to be in the Son by 
Q and in the other Persons by R. Effectively, then, Christ’s humanity is equally present to all three 
members of  the Trinity, and this is so «by Q», that is to say, as an end in itself  rather than as a means 
to an end. Clearly this does not mean that all three members of  the Trinity are incarnated in Christ, 
as Llull goes to great lengths on numerous occasions in order to demonstrate the fittingness of  
one divine Person’s being incarnated and of  the fact that this person is the Son of  God (Llull 2007: 
138).17 This again reinforces the fact that for Llull—i.e. pace Dupuis 1994 and Marchel 1967 and 
1971— Christ’s human prayers would be addressed to the Trinity as a whole, not just to God the 
Father, as occurs in the Biblical witness, not least for the straightforward—and negative—reason 
that, in the latter, the doctrine of  the Trinity had not yet been codified as it later was to be at the 
First Council of  Nicaea in 325.
5. «Reception according to the capacity of  the receiver»:
Although earlier on we have quoted from works more or less contemporaneous to Fèlix, namely, 
DFI (1287-9), QADS (1289) and the Ars ad faciendum et solvendum quaestiones (Lectura Artis inventivae et 
Tabulae generalis) (1294-5), we have mainly concentrated on some of  Llull’s earliest works so far—
LC (1273-4?), the Llibre de demostracions (1274-6), and LPT (1274-83), for instance. We now return 
17 Note that the Eighth and Eleventh Councils of  Toledo (in 653 and 675 respectively) had stressed that neither God 
the Father nor the Holy Spirit was made incarnate. See also Llibre de demostracions, Book IV, Ch. 1, §§ 7-8, where Llull 
not only refutes the possibility of  multiple incarnations but the incarnation of  all three Persons of  the Trinity: «cor per 
la encarnació de la .j.a persona tan solament, sia mills significat que en la essencia divina ha diversitat de subpòsits, la 
qual diversitat no fóra tan be significada ni demostrada si totes .iij. persones se encarnassen per assò convenc que la .j.a 
persona s encarnàs tant solament» (Llull 1930: 418 [Catalan]; Llull 1722a (1965): 168 (345) [Latin]). Cf. also DFI, Part 
IV, § 14 (Llull 1729a (1965): 29-31 (406-408); here 30 (407)): «ideo convenit quod Deus necessario ita sit incarnatus 
quod non destruatur connexio et unio praedictarum rationum, quae destruereatur si omnia divina suppositorum essent 
incarnata: quia, si unum divinum suppositum tantum non sufficeret ut Deus esset incarnatus, ut persona Filii, sic illud 
suppositum esset defectivum in Bonitate, etc.» Llull explains at some length in QADS (1289), why God did not become 
incarnate in multiple human beings, QADS, q. 28 (Llull 1729b (1965): 48-50 (65-67)).
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briefly to QADS, q. 31, «Quare Deus non creavit tantum bonum quantum potest creare?», §§ 6 and 
7, where we find two possible clues to the state of  affairs described in Fèlix (Llull 1729b (1965): 54 
(71)) as well as evidence of  Llull’s familiarity with the doctrine of  «reception according to the capacity 
of  the receiver», which, as noted earlier, derives ultimately from Proclus’s Prop. 173.  Section 6 of  
QADS discusses Creation in terms of  its end as well as the image of  that end («finis et imago ipsius 
finis»), that image being created goodness, created greatness, etc. Here the human intellect, «tam 
separatus quam conjunctus», acts as a mirror («speculari») and subject wherein the «finis bonitatis» 
etc., might see the divine Dignities reflected. However, here Llull stresses the receptive limits of  
the created world as regards its capacity proportionately to reflect the Dignities («convenit quod 
divina potestas crearet tantum bonum quantum potuit creare secundum magnitudinem bonitatis etc. 
praedictarum imaginum, quam habent ipsae imagines in sui proportione ad ipsae Dignitates» (idem: all 
quotations; emphasis added). Finis, imago (though, interestingly not the customary similitudo, a term 
not used here), speculum/mirall (as in speculari), and proportio, it should be noted, are all terms which 
figure very prominently and are used in a maximal sense in Llull’s Christological discourse (Hughes 
2005-06). He goes on to stress, however, in the following section (§ 7), that (despite such limits) 
Creation must always be conceived of  maximally rather than minimally: «quando potestas creavit 
bonum, creavit illud tantum quantum potuit ratione majoritate non autem ratione minoritate, et 
per consequens ratione magnitudinis, non autem ratione parvitatis, ut ejus actus creandi quantum 
posset distaret a parvitate et minoritate» (Llull 1729b (1965): 54 (71)).
In the earlier Llibre de demostracions, however, Llull makes reference on a number of  occasions to the 
possibility that the supreme good can make an infinite from a finite good, if  only the latter were 
capable of  receiving infinitude—e.g. Book IV, Ch. 1, §§ 1-8; Book IV, Ch. 5, § 4; Book IV, Ch. 46, § 
8 (Llull 1930: 166-68, 175, 238 respectively). However, such statements should be set alongside the 
qualification or inherently limiting factor present in created perfection, namely, in Book IV, Ch. 8, § 
2 of  the same work and in Llull’s own words, that if  the Son of  God were to make the Son of  Man 
perfect and infinitely and eternally capable of  perfecting, then man would be equal to the Supreme 
Good, which is impossible (Llull 1930: 180).
Perhaps a further clue to the conundrum posed by the quotation from Fèlix lies in Part I, Ch. 9 
of  that work itself, insofar as we find therein an assertion to the effect that the human nature of  
Christ is not sufficient by itself  of  redeeming the human race, although united with the Son of  
God, that nature is in fact capable of  redeeming more than a million worlds (setgles) (Llull 1985: 
703-05 [English]; Llull 1989: 64-65 [Catalan]). So, if  Christ’s human nature on its own is not capable 
of  redeeming humankind, would the prayers of  Christ’s human nature (and of  Mary and the other 
denizens in Paradise) addressed to its divine counterpart (and here, rather uncharacteristically, not 
to the Person of  the Son of  God or explicitly to the Trinity as a whole) be any more effective in 
achieving a response or in drawing down God’s grace upon the actual sins of  man?
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 If  we give a negative answer to this question how can we explain such a possible conclusion, 
if  we accept that Llull generally shows an entirely favourable attitude towards prayer? Given that 
Christ is the supreme created being, should not his prayers be supremely effective and therefore 
eminently susceptible of  being heeded by God? If  Christ cannot successfully enjoin God to bestow 
His grace upon man, who can? Are all prayers to go unanswered? Has man so completely alienated 
himself  from God and God’s designs that all rescue is impossible?
6. Prayer in the Medicina de peccat (July 1300):
A brief  glance at a later text, namely, the Medicina de peccat, a poetic work containing a very lengthy 
section on prayer—Part V, «D’oració» (Llull 1938: 166-204; ll. 4671-5858)—might shed some light 
upon the situation described by the Fèlix quotation(s) and upon the way I myself  have tried to 
elucidate the problematic surrounding it. As the section of  the poem proceeds, we note that the 
poet addresses a prayer to Christ asking that his sins be pardoned in Chapter 2 «De oració de 
què», ll. 4921-34 (Llull 1938: 174). Repentance for one’s sins, however, is required if  they are to 
be forgiven; consequently, some fifty lines later within the same chapter, Llull casts the poet as 
penitent sinner at l. 4987 (Llull 1938: 176). Notably, the figures in the passage from Fèlix are far 
from being remorseful or even aware of  the fact that they are sinning. They are, in fact, recalcitrant, 
habitual sinners oblivious to their disservice to God and the harm they cause themselves. 
The penitence Llull holds up as an example (in prayer) is of  paramount importance if  one wishes 
to secure God’s grace, this being the correct manner of  praying to God, one he cannot refuse—«e 
vuyl plorar e sospirar / per penedir e per amar; car per ests .ij. pot peccador / aver gracia del 
Senyor», Part V, Ch. 5, «De oració de qualitat», ll. 5329-32 (Llull 1938: 187). Indeed, ll. 5608-21ff. 
which bring to a close Part V, Ch. 7 «De oració de loc» (Llull 1938: 196-97), and deal with God’s 
justice and forgiveness, also give instruction as to how to «fer / a Deu veray oracio» (Llull 1938: 
201; ll. 5760-61), as Llull later expresses matters in Part V, Ch. 9 «oració ab què», ll. 5741-5858 (Llull 
1938: 201-204). This last chapter, along with the preceding one, namely, Ch. 8 «manera d’oració», 
ll. 5622-5740 (Llull 1938: 197-201) provide full guidelines as to how to conduct oneself  in matters 
of  prayer (Clot 2014: personal communication). Again in Chapter 8, ll. 5689-90, Llull cautions the 
reader to have the correct aim when praying, that is to say, not to pray for oneself  but rather for 
God, «car Deus no vol hom exoir / qui vula mays esser salvat, / que Deu servit entes amat e onrat» 
(Llull 1938: 199; ll. 5698-701). For prayers, even and especially, should be guided by man’s first 
intention. A further warning is then given by Llull some hundred lines later (Part V, Ch. 9, ll. 5815-
16) regarding the degree to which one invests oneself  in prayer and the negative consequences of  
failing sufficiently to do so, «car se / qui prega ab petit / totes vetz no es exoit» (Llull 1938: 203). 
The various desiderata for proper prayer given by Llull as well as his explanations of  the circumstances 
in which prayer will not be heeded by God are of  relevance to the problematic quotation from Fèlix 
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on which we are commenting. However, one very obvious difference is that the prayer of  Christ’s 
human nature which in Fèlix appears to be unsuccessful in drawing down God’s grace, and which 
seems to be fully counteracted by the gravity of  mankind’s persistent wickedness—we should not 
forget the recluse’s final dream in which «viu en visió com grans són los falliments que los hòmens fan contra 
Déu, per los quals defalliments tan grans no és meravella si Déus leixa los hòmens de aquest món perseverar en lur 
malícia»—is a very different matter from the prayers of  a penitent sinner-poet correctly addressing 
God in order to secure His pardon and His grace. For a start, Christ—and indeed, for Llull, Mary 
too—was born without sin. And Christ’s impeccability is a Christian article of  faith, and one to 
which Llull refers often, not least in Part Four («De Incarnatione»), § 20, of  his Disputatio fidelis et 
infidelis (1287-89) (Llull 1729a (1965): 34 (411)). The Council of  Chalcedon in fact determined that 
Christ is «like us in all respects except for sin» (κατά πάντα ὅμοιον ἡμῖν χωρίς ἁμαρτίας—per omnia 
nobis simile absque peccato) (Tanner 1990: 86). He can, therefore, by definition, never occupy the role 
of  penitent sinner. What he can offer in its place, however, is a maximally formulated petition to 
God in prayer, lesser gradations of  which are also offered by his co-intercessors mentioned at the 
end of  Fèlix, Chapter 105, a petition which stands a better chance of  being heeded by God than 
any other. We should finally note, at least in passing, the lurking presence of  a bitter irony in the 
last quotation insofar as, within a work specifically devoted to revealing a multiplicity of  meravelles 
or wonders, there is at least one such whose implications are far from pleasant; namely, the thought 
that God might after all leave man to persist in his wickedness.
7. Conclusion:
I began this article by detailing certain possible influences from the common medieval Neoplatonic 
heritage (Plotinus, Proclus, the Pseudo-Dionysius, the Liber de causis) from which scholastic writers 
and Llull himself  drew. This enabled me to focus attention upon several features therein of  
relevance to Llull’s conception of  Christ’s human agency, to the efficacy of  Christ’s prayer, to the 
structural asymmetry underlying Llull’s version of  procession and return, to his adoption of  the 
principle of  ‘reception according to the capacity of  the receiver’, and his at times ‘metaphorical’ 
construal of  the hypostatic union (i.e. the soul-body analogy).
I then continued by outlining a possible contradiction within and between Llull’s texts concerning 
the efficacy of  Christ’s prayers—that is to say, of  Christ in his humanity viewed as secondary 
efficient cause and also as supreme created effect—in the light of  man’s recalcitrant wickedness and 
the exceptional reciprocal love that the divine and human natures in Christ have for the humanity 
and the deity with which they are respectively conjoined. I then showed how the two movements 
(of  descent and ascent) in Christ find themselves reflected in Llull’s writings by a hierarchy of  
intentions regarding the purpose of  the Incarnation, a purpose that must be referred predominantly 
to God Himself. I went on to describe how in several works more or less contemporary to Fèlix 
Llull reaffirms this point by stating that God both creates and recreates principally for his own ends, 
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yet that despite the evident hierarchy of  ends in Creation and in Christ, he is keen to maximise the 
possibility of  a full circulation of  the two aforementioned movements, as well as to minimise the 
possibility of  any interruptions thereto. 
I then set out Llull’s position with respect to the issue of  whether prayer in Christ expresses either 
the relationship a) between the Son of  Man and God the Father or b) between the Son of  Man 
and God per se or the Trinity as a whole. Following this, I sought to delineate Llull’s possibly 
Antiochene interpretation of  the hypostatic union and the communicatio idiomatum, with a view to 
presenting Llull’s analogy between the conjunction of  soul and body in man and the union of  
divine and human natures in Christ as being one mediated by a certain «nature of  soul» and «nature 
of  body» in the former case and «Divine power (virtut)» and «human power (virtut)» in the latter. 
This led me to point to a basic asymmetry within the hypostatic union, itself  a reiteration of  the 
abovementioned theme of  a hierarchy of  ends, an asymmetry that can usefully be considered 
in the light of  the inferiority of  second to first causes, as expressed in both Proclus’ Elementatio 
theologica and the Liber de causis. I then paused to reflect upon the existence of  an interruption in or 
disturbance to the circulation between uncreated and created reality and back, described from the 
time of  Fèlix onwards by Llull using the Neoplatonic terminology of  influentia/refluentia, terminology 
itself  deriving from the corpus dionysiacum and the Liber de causis.  I identified four possible sources of  
such interruption, leaving myself  the task of  still having to explain the possibility a) that God (i.e. 
the First Cause) might withdraw His grace from man (in a downward direction) and b) that even 
Christ’s intercession on man’s behalf  (in the form of  His humanity and as second cause) through 
prayer (in an upward direction) might prove insufficient to mollify God. That second causes are 
less potent and less effective than the First Cause is a point central to the doctrine of  causality 
expounded in the Liber de causis. 
I use the word «mollify» here, because in the passage from Fèlix under consideration, there is a 
strong sense not only that man’s wrongdoings might be too terrible to be forgiven or that his lack 
of  mindfulness towards and neglect of  God might deserve some weighty rebuke, but also that the 
reader is in the presence of, if  not the wrathful God of  the Old Testament, then at least a God 
who might prove unresponsive to the petitions even of  Christ, Mary and the saints, and capable 
of  withdrawing the fullness of  His Providence (or efficient causality) from man. We should bear 
in mind in this respect, however, that man, as created effect, is held by Llull to be considerably 
inferior to Christ the man, who in his humanity is the supreme created effect, and thus far less 
potent as an efficient cause, i.e. in terms of  pure causality his wrongdoings might be presumed to 
have little effect upon God as First Cause. We should remember here, therefore, that God enjoys 
final causality, though His end be in Himself, and that God in Christ is the final cause of  creation. 
God might be able, then, to withhold his efficient causality ad extra, but His final causality is as 
intrinsic to Him as Himself.
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The reader should nevertheless note at this point that Proposition 70 of  Proclus’ Elementatio 
theologica states (in the English translation) that 
where the [secondary cause] has withdrawn the [higher cause] is still present (for the gift of  
the more powerful principle [i.e. of  the higher cause] is slower to abandon the participant, 
being more efficacious, and also inasmuch as through the gift of  its consequent [i.e. of  the 
secondary cause] it has made its own irradiation stronger) (Proclus 2004 [2nd ed. 1963]: 67).
This thought is echoed in Proposition 1.15 of  the Liber de causis, which states (again in English): 
«And when the second cause removes itself  from its effect, the prime cause does not remove itself  
from it, because the prime cause has a greater and more intense adherence to the thing than its 
proximate cause» (Anon. 1984: 20). The notion, therefore, that the higher cause might withdraw 
its influentia is as good as foreclosed by both texts. Evidence to the contrary from the realm of  
scholasticism, however, in both a natural and a Christological context, can be found in William of  
Ware’s In Sententias 161 (MS 1438, fo. 108vb, Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek), where 
God is seen to withhold his primary causation in the biblical story of  Daniel and his companions 
(Dan 3) who, though cast into a fiery furnace, remain unscathed; as cited in Cross (2002: 141 and 
n. 20).
I went on to distinguish Christ’s role with respect to Original Sin and actual sin, highlighting the 
effect man’s various failures and misdeeds, though inferior causes, might have on the communication 
between Christ’s two natures, which according to an Antiochene understanding, has never been 
too strong in any case. Such considerations point to the need for man actively to contribute to his 
destiny and to collaborate therewith by embracing virtue, avoiding vice and keeping the Incarnation 
at the forefront of  his mind. Indeed, I showed how, in Llull’s writings, God’s aid is fostered by the 
signification of  the Incarnation to the powers of  the human soul. The aid given by the first (or 
prime) cause to the second cause in its operation is a thesis expressed clearly in Proposition 1 of  
the Liber de causis (Anon. 1984: 20; Aquinas 1996: 6, 8), while the doctrine of  the limited receptivity 
of  the created world used by Llull echoes the remaining propositions from the Liber de causis cited 
in the Introduction to this article.
I then re-examined Llull’s use of  what he, by this stage, calls the «metaphor» between the soul-body 
relation in man and the human-divine union in Christ in terms of  its being a suggestive analogy 
capable of  evoking the way in which the relative weakness of  Christ’s human nature in that union 
encapsulates and dramatises the essential weakness of  the created with respect to the uncreated 
and the finite with respect to the infinite. Such thoughts lead one to consider that this ontological 
and operational deficiency in creation and in Christ can only be adequately supplemented on two 
conditions: 1) that Christ’s human nature is conceived maximally, his human agency in prayer 
being directed upwards towards God as Trinity but also God as Divine essence, this agency as 
intercessor also being conceived maximally; and 2) that God is willing (and wills) to bestow His 
grace downwards upon man in full. If  only one of  these conditions is satisfied, we are left in the 
position suggested by the Fèlix passage, namely, that despite Christ’s (and Mary’s, etc.) best efforts 
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in prayer, no response is forthcoming from God. A third condition should also be written into 
this «contract», namely, that as previously mentioned, if  man is not penitent and fails actively to 
pursue his first intention in life as in prayer, the contract could or should be terminated or annulled 
forthwith. In the passage from Fèlix we find that the second and third of  these conditions do not 
obtain, and thereby Christ’s and the other intercessors’ prayers seem not to be answered. 
Since God’s will, however, cannot be said to be dependent upon or conditioned by anything, 
particularly by an effect that can also be considered a second cause—man’s collaboration or 
otherwise in his salvation included—it is probably safer simply to say, as Llull himself  concludes, 
that despite Christ’s, Mary’s and the saints’ prayers on man’s behalf, it should come as no surprise 
if  God were to withhold His grace and deny man his ultimate destiny—«si Déus leixa los hòmens 
de aquest món perseverar en lur malícia»—, given that we find not only the absence of  a maximally 
positive response on his part towards God but also the presence of  one in which God is minimally 
respected and actively repudiated—«grans són los falliments que los hòmens fan contra Déu» (Llull 
1989: 341).
A few final words perhaps should be said to the effect that although these latter sentiments are 
in fact voiced by Llull in the indicative rather than the subjunctive mood, this fact is attributable 
to the author’s desire to lend immediacy in the form of  the present tense to the recluse’s vision 
while at the same time making a general statement about man’s condition and his relation to God. 
It should also be remembered that salvation is God’s gift to man and is made at His discretion and 
that worship is man’s response to God. Prayer, of  course, is a form of  such worship, and Christ’s 
prayers as man form part of  this response. Lastly, one should bear in mind that what might be seen 
as man’s collaboration in his own salvation could more profitably be considered his participation 
in the worship of  God.
8. Appendix: 
At the risk of  undermining my entire line of  argument, I feel I should alert the reader to at least 
one of  a series of  points raised by Ruiz Simon (Ruiz Simon 2014: personal communication) after 
he had read a late draft of  this article. Unfortunately, his comments came too late for me to make 
all but a few adjustments and would have required a wholesale reconceptualisation of  the matter 
at hand, given that he delivers some very serious challenges to the interpretation I have been 
giving. He takes issue, in fact, with a number of  the basic points I have tried to put across, as 
well as contributing helpful suggestions towards the enrichment of  our understanding of  Llull’s 
Christology via reflection on the influence of  the Pseudo-Dionysius’ DDN thereupon. It is my 
provisional opinion, however, that Llull’s sometimes complex positions regarding Christology are 
only partly explained by recourse to the writings of  the Pseudo-Dionysius in their role as the chief  
conduit through which Neoplatonic ideas of  causality became subject to «Christianisation». I hope 
to explore some of  these questions at a later date.
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Ruiz Simon, then, points out that, in the full quotation from Fèlix in question, there is an asymmetry 
in content between the prayer of  Christ’s human nature and that of  Mary, the archangels, etc., a 
fact which I had otherwise overlooked. Christ’s prayer is simply «per son poble», he states, whereas 
that of  Mary, etc., is so that «lo mon fos bo et en bon estament» (see above § 2, p. 168). Christ’s 
prayer, therefore, is «selective»—here Ruiz Simon refers to Romans 8:34 (cf. Romans 8:27) and to 
John 17:9ff. as Biblical precedents, and the «poble de Déu» referred to are those predestined for 
salvation, an end which will be brought about by the divine rather than human efficacy present 
in Christ. Christ’s prayer thus also corresponds to the will of  God, whose power is capable of  
bringing about whatever He wills. Christ’s prayer is one in which «Christus nihil aliud voluit nisi 
quod scivit Deum velle» (as cited above, § 2, p. 168), and thus there can be no divided will in Christ, 
unlike what appears to be the case in Luke 22:42 or Matthew 26:39 (as cited above, § 3.3., p. 178).
Ruiz Simon goes on to suggest that the recluse plays a similar role to Fèlix in Book I, Chapters 1-6 
of  the work of  the same name, who «marvels» or «wonders» at the fact that God did not protect 
the «shepherdess», who placed all her trust in Him, from the wolf  (Llull 1985: 661-662; 1989: 
19). Here, neither the recluse nor Fèlix are responding as theologians. Furthermore, he states that 
Llull’s distinction between the two aforementioned kinds of  prayer show that he had a very clear 
understanding of  theological orthodoxy, as does the fact that Christ’s prayer is attributed to his 
human nature, in keeping with St Thomas Aquinas’ statements in ST, III, q. 21, a. 1 co. (Aquinas 
1980a: 803; as also cited above, § 3.3, p. 179). Ruiz Simon’s solution, therefore, successfully reconciles 
Llull’s thought in this respect with orthodoxy and effectively dissolves the dilemma I have been 
discussing in this article, although it seems to me that there is some negative excess present in Llull’s 
treatment of  the issue which is not entirely accounted for or removed by the solution Ruiz Simon 
proposes. 
What I think the difference of  opinion between Ruiz Simon and myself  boils down to is this: 
namely, that I consider the quotations from Fèlix discussed above to reveal a genuine disjunction 
expressed by Llull between the relative capacities of  Christ’s two natures, a disjunction which 
embodies a form of  causal insufficiency or weakness in his humanity, and which poses a constant 
threat to the possibility of  man’s return to God. I have also suggested that such a state of  affairs 
is reinforced by Llull’s oscillating views regarding the nature of  the hypostatic union in Christ, 
views which at times seem to reflect a crypto-Monophysite understanding thereof  (as seen in his 
use of  the soul-body analogy; cf. John of  Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, III, 3 (John of  Damascus 
1864: 990A)) and at times a neo-Antiochene position. I also contend that the figure of  the recluse, 
though not a professional theologian, is giving voice to bona fide theological reflections. 
Ruiz Simon’s elegant formulation, on the other hand, holds that any disjunction or dilemma in 
Llull’s treatment of  the matters at hand is, at best, a false one, and that reading Llull’s utterances 
through the filter of  Pseudo-Dionysian Christology, best seen in DDN, Chapters 1-3, and Letter 
4, ‘To the same monk Gaius’, themselves filtered through John of  Damascus’ subsequent De fide 
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orthodoxa, III, 19 and 24, in particular, helps us properly to reconcile his statements with orthodoxy. 
On this reading, the very question of  the efficacy of  Christ’s prayer as an operation of  his human 
nature does not arise, since no causal power attaches to that nature which is not (equally) that of  
its divine counterpart. In other words, no disjunction exists between Christ’s two wills (cf. John 
of  Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, III, 15, who states that «tametsi in Theandrica, seu in Dei simul et 
hominis actione nequeant disjungi» (1864: 1055A)). Also on this reading, the recluse’s statements 
constitute strictly personal, if  literary, reflections standing well outside the bounds of  scholastic 
theological discourse. 
I leave the reader to deliberate on such matters, though add that perhaps the result of  this 
deliberation will rest on whether we judge Classical theatrical traditions regarding the interplay of  
irony and its opposite to have any bearing at all on the comments Llull places in the mouth of  the 
recluse. Consequently, we might want to consider what position the latter could possibly occupy 
along the spectrum between the braggadocio generally exhibited by the alazôn (ἀννννν) and the 
understatement characteristic of  the eirôn (νἴννν), or whether we cast him as a simple «wonderer». 
If  we reject such a reading in terms of  Classical models, and I only invoke them on the grounds of  
Ramon Llull’s evident dramatisation of  the recluse’s words, we might equally wish to reject Richard 
Rorty’s post-analytic definition of  irony as «inherently a private matter» (1989: 87) and its opposite 
as nothing other than «common sense» (Rorty 1989: 74), for it seems that Ramon Llull’s construal 
of  the opposition between actual and apparent meaning, viz. irony, in the Fèlix quotation(s) I have 
discussed, is contrasted with its own opposite, namely, Christian orthodoxy conceived in terms of  
sincerity and literalness. The differences between Ruiz Simon’s interpretation and my own hinge 
upon this dialectic, though it is indeed a further irony that my own more «literal» reading—albeit 
one that finds room for Llull’s «metaphorical» treatment of  the hypostatic union— has failed to 
eliminate every suggestion of  possible heterodoxy among some of  the complex positions to which 
Llull gives voice in his treatment of  Christological matters relating to the hypostatic union, causality 
and prayer.
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